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Article 
Privatizing Ethics in Corporate 
Reorganizations 
A. Mechele Dickerson† 
Bankruptcy and corporate governance scholars continue to 
debate “control rights” in Chapter 11 reorganization proceed-
ings and how those rights should be allocated when a firm 
seeks to restructure in bankruptcy.1 Most of this scholarship 
concludes that, as a positive matter, creditors now contractual-
ly control who will be hired to run firms in bankruptcy cases. 
The scholarship then considers whether this allocation of con-
trol rights is efficient or consistent with the goals of bankruptcy 
laws. 
The scholarship fails to consider adequately one normative 
matter that is a critical factor in deciding whether control 
rights have been properly allocated in corporate insolvencies, 
namely, how ethical and fiduciary duties should be constructed 
or how those duties should be imposed on the people who con-
trol firms in bankruptcy. Moreover, the scholarship fails to 
question whether, as a normative matter, creditors should be 
allowed to insert a creditor-controlled private trustee into a po-
sition normally held by a public, statutorily authorized trustee. 
This Article fills that void by first highlighting the increased 
presence and influence of managers who are hired as a result of 
creditor demands—that is, privatized trustees. The Article con-
 
 † Fulbright and Jaworski Professor of Law, University of Texas Law 
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gia, Atlanta Division, and to members of the Board of Directors of the Sou-
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 1. See infra notes 133, 134, and 136. 
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cludes by arguing that privatized trustees should have the 
same ethical obligations and duties in bankruptcy cases as the 
duties the Bankruptcy Code2 (the Code) imposes on public, sta-
tutorily authorized trustees. 
Part II of this Article reviews the statutory and common 
law fiduciary duties that directors and officers (i.e., managers) 
of firms have outside of bankruptcy.3 Part III discusses the pre-
sumption, under earlier bankruptcy laws, that existing manag-
ers would not be allowed to operate the company during the re-
organization and would instead be replaced by a trustee 
authorized by the statute. It explains that the Code reverses 
this presumption by giving the firm’s managers control of the 
firm during the bankruptcy case. Part III then describes the 
procedures firms must use when hiring entities during bank-
ruptcy cases and notes the Code’s requirement that the people 
who control firms in bankruptcy proceedings be disinterested 
and not have actual or perceived conflicts of interest. 
Part IV shows how notwithstanding a statutory presump-
tion of control by prepetition managers, creditors use various 
credit arrangements to seize control of a bankruptcy firm’s 
cash, and that creditors increasingly control the firm’s ultimate 
disposition in the bankruptcy proceeding. Part V documents 
how creditors—especially hedge funds and other distressed 
debt traders—have seized the right to force firms to appoint 
turnaround specialists, chief restructuring officers, and other 
managers who ultimately exercise the powers of public statuto-
ry trustees. Though these private trustees have become com-
mon, especially in large Chapter 11 reorganizations, the Code 
does not authorize them and, indeed, makes no reference to 
 
 2. 11 U.S.C. § 1–1532 (2000). 
 3. See LAWRENCE E. MITCHELL, CORPORATE IRRESPONSIBILITY: AMERI-
CA’S NEWEST EXPORT 101 (2001). Some states impose fiduciary duties specifi-
cally on directors, while others also impose fiduciary duties on nondirector of-
ficers who control the firm. See, e.g., Strougo v. Bassini, 282 F.3d 162, 173 (2d 
Cir. 2002) (“Maryland courts have clearly established the proposition that . . . 
officers owe fiduciary duties to . . . the shareholders.”); Lama Holding v. Smith 
Barney, Inc., 668 N.E.2d 1370, 1375 (N.Y. 1996) (acknowledging the same fi-
duciary duty in Delaware); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.42(a) (2008). Because 
the CEOs of most firms also are directors (often Chair of the Board), this Ar-
ticle will use the term “manager” to refer both to directors and also the high-
ranking officers who operate the firm. W. Steve Albrecht et al., Fraud and 
Corporate Executives: Agency, Stewardship and Broken Trust, 5 J. FORENSIC 
ACCT. 109, 112 n.3 (2004) (noting that eight of the ten most prominent compa-
nies that had significant financial scandals had board chairs who were also 
CEOs). 
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them. Moreover, it is unclear how privatized trustees can ade-
quately represent the interests of all parties in the case when 
they are hired because of, and often report to, one creditor or 
creditor group. 
Part VI stresses that the duties and responsibilities of 
these new private trustees are not clearly defined and shows 
how their presence in cases often dramatically increases ad-
ministrative costs. This Part also highlights the agency con-
flicts that arise when privatized trustees—who are not autho-
rized by the Code and who often remain employed by entities 
other than the debtor firm—are allowed to control the firm. The 
Article concludes by arguing that these new privatized trustees 
should be allowed to control firms in bankruptcy only if they 
show they can comply with the fiduciary duties the Code and 
former bankruptcy laws impose on statutorily appointed public 
trustees. Specifically, private trustees should be required to 
prove that they are disinterested, that they have no interest 
adverse to the firm or the firm’s other constituents, and that 
any relationship they have with a particular creditor in the 
case will not prevent them from protecting the interests of all 
other parties involved in the case. 
I. MANAGERS’ NONBANKRUPTCY  
DUTIES AND POWERS  
A. STATE LAW 
The fiduciary duties managers have during a bankruptcy 
case are largely created by nonbankruptcy laws. These duties 
outside of bankruptcy vary somewhat depending on whether 
the firm is solvent, approaching insolvency, or insolvent. 
1. Solvent Firms 
In general, managers have duties of loyalty and care to a 
solvent company’s shareholders. The duty of loyalty requires 
managers to act in the corporation’s best interest, to refrain 
from using confidential information for personal gain, and to 
refrain from putting their or another party’s interests ahead of 
the company’s interest.4 The duty of care requires managers to 
 
 4. See Mann v. GTCR Golder Rauner, L.L.C., 483 F. Supp. 2d 884, 900 
(D. Ariz. 2007) (“Instead, the best interest of the corporation and its share-
holders [must] take precedence over any interest possessed by a director, offic-
er[,] or controlling shareholder and not shared by the shareholders generally.” 
(alteration in original) (citation omitted)); Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 
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make decisions that do not negligently cause harm to the firm 
and to act when their attention to a situation would prevent 
harm.5 Directors who use a rational decisionmaking process 
can raise the business judgment rule as a defense to a claim for 
breach of due care.6 Indeed, some courts presume that directors 
are informed, act in good faith, and intend to make decisions 
that are in the firm’s best interest.7 Given this, the business 
judgment rule ensures that most breach of due care suits will 
not succeed, excepting some highly publicized scandals such as 
Enron or WorldCom, where either plaintiffs or public officials 
sue to “send a message.”8 
Managers generally owe no duties to the firm’s employees 
or the creditors of a solvent firm, presumably because those 
entities are protected by the terms of their contracts with the 
firm. Creditors are deemed not to need additional protections 
 
A.2d 345, 361–62 (Del. 1993) (“Essentially, the duty of loyalty mandates that 
the best interest of the corporation and its shareholders takes precedence over 
any interest possessed by a director, officer or controlling shareholder and not 
shared by the stockholders generally.”); Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 
546 (N.Y. 1928) (“A trustee is held to something stricter than the morals of the 
market place. Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most sensi-
tive, is then the standard of behavior.”). 
 5. A number of states allow corporate charters to include provisions, 
however, that protect directors from civil liability based on a failure to monitor 
the firm’s business activities (or a failure to act). See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 
8, § 102(b)(7) (2001). 
 6. See Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 927 (Del. 
2003) (“The business judgment rule is a ‘presumption in making a business 
decision the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith 
and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the 
company.’” (citation omitted)).  
 7. See, e.g., Notinger v. Costa (In re Robotic Vision Sys., Inc.), 374 B.R. 
36, 45–46 (Bankr. D.N.H. 2007) (discussing the interplay between the busi-
ness judgment rule and the duty of care). Directors who engage in self-dealing 
cannot, however, use the business judgment rule to defend their decision to 
engage in a self-interested transaction. See, e.g., tit. 8, § 102(b)(7); Revlon, Inc. 
v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986). 
 8. See E. Norman Veasey, A Perspective on Liability Risks to Directors, 
DIRECTORS MONTHLY, Feb. 2005, at 3 (citing an assertion by a former Chief 
Justice of the Delaware Supreme Court that the “time-honored business 
judgment rule” continues to protect “conscientious directors who exercise due 
care, good faith, and independent judgment”); Ben White, Former Directors 
Agree to Settle Class Actions, WASH. POST, Jan. 8, 2005, at E1. Moreover, any 
damages assessed against directors almost always are paid by the company’s 
directors’ and officers’ insurance policy. Cf. Bernard Black, et al., Outside Di-
rector Liability, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1055, 1059–60 (2006) (noting that although 
outside directors are frequently sued, they rarely make out-of-pocket pay-
ments because they are protected by indemnification agreements, director and 
officer insurance, shareholders, or by the company itself ). 
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because, unlike shareholders, their contracts ostensibly are 
arms-length transactions with terms that protect the creditors’ 
interests.9 Until the Enron era, virtually all courts assumed 
that a solvent—even if poorly run—business could pay its bills 
and that creditors needed only their bargained-for protec-
tions.10 
2. Firms in the Vicinity or Zone of Insolvency 
Over the last decade, creditors have increasingly argued 
that managers were approving risky transactions that rendered 
solvent firms insolvent.11 In response, corporate and insolvency 
scholars and lawyers have considered whether courts should 
impose duties on the managers of a solvent firm when the firm 
approaches insolvency—that is, when it is in the vicinity or 
zone of insolvency. 
“Zone of insolvency” describes the period when a firm’s fin-
ances are precarious, but the firm is still solvent.12 Some con-
 
 9. Lorenz v. CSX Corp., 1 F.3d 1406, 1417 (3d Cir. 1993); Metro. Life Ins. 
Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 1504, 1524–25 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (citing 
Meinhard, 164 N.E. at 546); Katz v. Oak Indus., Inc., 508 A.2d 873, 879–80 
(Del. Ch. 1986). It is unclear what (if any) duties managers have to tort vic-
tims and other creditors who have an involuntary relationship with the firm 
since they have no implied or actual contractual rights. See also Henry T. C. 
Hu & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Abolition of the Corporate Duty to Creditors, 
107 COLUM. L. REV. 1321, 1349 (2007) (advocating the abolition of the duty-
shifting doctrine, with a duty to creditors only arising upon the firm filing a 
bankruptcy petition). 
 10. See In re Lifschultz Fast Freight, 132 F.3d 339, 346 (7th Cir. 1997) 
(“Creditors extend credit voluntarily to a debtor. The debtor owes no duties to 
the creditor beyond those it promises in its contract . . . .”); United States v. 
Jolly, 102 F.3d 46, 48 (2d Cir. 1996) (“Borrower-lender relationships are typi-
cally at arm’s-length, and a firm’s obligations to creditors are generally re-
garded solely as contractual.”); Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Rad-
nor Holdings Corp. v. Tennenbaum Capital Partners, LLC (In re Radnor 
Holdings Corp.), 353 B.R. 820, 843 (Bankr. D. Del. 2006) (describing how the 
business judgment rule protects “solvent, barely solvent, and insolvent corpo-
rations” from creditors’ challenges to business decisions) (citation omitted); see 
also Robert Charles Clark, The Duties of the Corporate Debtor to Its Creditors, 
90 HARV. L. REV. 505, 544 (1977) (“As to contract creditors, fundamental rights 
and expectations are hard to come by, for the parties can and often do bargain 
about the allocation of risks and the compensation for bearing them.”). 
 11. See, e.g., Steinberg v. Kendig (In re Ben Franklin Retail Stores, Inc.), 
225 B.R. 646, 653–54 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1998). 
 12. See, e.g., Teleglobe USA Inc. v. BCE Inc. (In re Teleglobe Commc’ns 
Corp.), 493 F.3d 345, 384 (3d Cir. 2007) (defining insolvency as either a bal-
ance-sheet test in which assets are fewer than liabilities or as the inability to 
pay debts as they become due); id. at 356 & n.9 (describing the zone of insol-
vency as the “amorphous” and “ill-defined” period before insolvency); Carrieri 
v. Jobs.com Inc., 393 F.3d 508, 515 (5th Cir. 2004) (noting that the debtor en-
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tend that, when a firm enters the zone of insolvency, managers 
have a duty to consider the interests of the entire corporate 
community (i.e., creditors, employees, and shareholders).13 Dur-
ing the zone of insolvency, managers would have a duty to the 
corporate community to maximize the enterprise’s long-term 
wealth-creating capacity—presumably the same duties of loyal-
ty and due care owed to shareholders of a healthy corporation.14 
Likewise, in assessing whether managers breached their duties 
(however defined and to whomever owed), courts ostensibly will 
continue to apply the business judgment rule.15 
Imposing dual duties on managers when a firm is in the 
zone of insolvency exacerbates the uncertainty and agency con-
flicts that already exist because of the divergent interests 
shareholders and creditors have in a firm once the firm is ei-
ther in the vicinity of insolvency or is insolvent.16 The differing 
interests of creditors and shareholders can create significant 
agency conflicts for managers, since the managers theoretically 
run the company for the benefit of both groups. That is, because 
creditors are entitled to receive no more than the amount of 
debt provided in the contract and rarely receive any financial 
benefits from risky ventures, they prefer that managers avoid 
high-risk but potentially high-value activities that erode the 
 
tered the zone of insolvency when it projected a cumulative negative cash flow 
for the next six months, at which time the company would run out of cash). 
Indications that a company may be in the “zone” include whether corporate 
liabilities exceed assets, whether it faces liquidity crises/cash flow problems 
(current or projected), whether there are potential or actual loan defaults, or 
whether a corporate transaction unreasonably depletes corporate capital. See 
Sherri Morissette, Directors’ Duties in the Zone of Insolvency: The Quandary of 
the Nonprofit Corp., AM. BANKR. INST. J., Mar. 2004, at 12. 
 13. Justin Wood, Director Duties and Creditor Protections in the Zone of 
Insolvency: A Comparison of the United States, Germany, and Japan, 26 PENN 
ST. INT'L L. REV. 139, 147–48 (2007); Christopher L. Barnett, Comment, 
Healthco and the “Insolvency Exception”: An Unnecessary Expansion of the 
Doctrine?, 16 BANKR. DEV. J. 441, 441–43 (2000). 
 14. See Wood, supra note 13, at 147–48 (discussing the expanded duties 
owed to creditors in the zone of insolvency); Barnett, supra note 13, at 441–43 
(same). 
 15. See Trenwik Am. Litig. Trust v. Ernst & Young, L.L.P., 906 A.2d 168, 
174 (Del. Ch. 2006), aff ’d, 931 A.2d 438 (Del. 2007) (noting that the business 
judgment rule applies when evaluating managers’ conduct during the zone of 
insolvency). 
 16. See E. Norman Veasey & Christine T. Di Guglielmo, What Happened 
in Delaware Corporate Law and Governance from 1992–2004? A Retrospective 
on Some Key Developments, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1399, 1429–31 (2005) (“The ob-
vious tension between the interests of creditors and those of stockholders is 
palpable and a vexing challenge for directors.”). 
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firm’s value, even if those activities might be financially benefi-
cial for the firm’s shareholders.17 In contrast, shareholders pre-
fer that managers engage in riskier business ventures when 
the firm approaches insolvency because they will reap the up-
side in benefits if the risky venture succeeds.18 Notwithstand-
ing creditor preferences, managers have an incentive to engage 
in high-risk activities that benefit shareholders because direc-
tors are often shareholders themselves. More importantly, 
managers always have an incentive to advance equity’s inter-
ests because shareholders have the power to call a board meet-
ing to replace directors (and, thus, officers). 
For a number of reasons, managers who ignore creditors’ 
interests face few risks based on the zone-of-insolvency theory. 
First, it is not clear when a company enters the zone of insol-
vency, and this lack of a well-defined temporal boundary makes 
it difficult to prove that managers failed to comply with any 
modified or additional duties arising in the zone.19 The zone-of-
insolvency theory of liability is somewhat amorphous because it 
replaces an event (balance sheet or equity insolvency) with a 
condition (a weakened financial state) as the trigger for impos-
ing additional duties on managers.20 Thus, even if managers 
have a duty to consider or protect creditor interests in the zone, 
it is unclear exactly what duties managers owe to shareholders 
or other constituents, let alone how to judge whether managers 
have complied with those duties.21 Moreover, it is unclear 
 
 17. A. Mechele Dickerson, A Behavioral Approach to Analyzing Corporate 
Failures, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1, 19 & n.67 (2003). 
 18. Id. at 19. 
 19. Teleglobe USA Inc. v. BCE Inc. (In re Teleglobe Commc’ns Corp.), 493 
F.3d 345, 356 n.9 (“A footnote from the Delaware Supreme Court’s latest opi-
nion on a related issue explains that this ‘zone’ is yet ill-defined . . . .”). 
 20. For example, one court suggested that if managers approved transac-
tions that caused the business to become insolvent or undercapitalized, then 
the company was in the zone of insolvency when they approved the transac-
tion. See Brandt v. Hicks, Muse & Co. (In re Healthco Int’l, Inc.), 208 B.R. 288, 
300–01 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1997). However, if the business was neither insolvent 
in the balance sheet or equity sense, it is unclear how directors would (or 
could) have known that it was in the vicinity of insolvency. A business is bal-
ance sheet insolvent “when the fair market value the firm’s assets is less than 
its total liabilities.” Dickerson, supra note 17, at 15. A business is equitably 
insolvent when it can no longer pay its bills “as they mature in the ordinary 
course of the business.” Id. 
 21. See Veasey & Guglielmo, supra note 16, at 1429 (“There is a very chal-
lenging issue of whether (and to what extent) directors, in making their busi-
ness decisions when the corporation is in the vicinity of insolvency, may be re-
quired to consider the interests of creditors . . . .”). 
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whether imposing additional duties will have the negative un-
intended consequence of causing risk-averse directors to either 
resign or take overly conservative actions.22 
If managers’ duties are to exercise due care and to avoid 
self-interested transactions, and if they continue to be pro-
tected by the business judgment rule, then managers are not 
required to engage in drastic actions (like liquidating the firm’s 
assets to pay creditor claims) if doing so would detrimentally 
harm shareholders’ interests.23 Instead, while in the zone of in-
solvency managers should continue to have the discretion to de-
termine whether an insolvent company can work out its prob-
lems, whether it should file for bankruptcy,24 or whether it 
should liquidate the firm either in or outside of bankruptcy.25 
3. Insolvent Firms 
Most courts and commentators conclude that managers’ fi-
duciary duties shift from shareholders to creditors when the 
firm is insolvent because creditors of insolvent firms must be 
paid on their claims before shareholders can receive distribu-
tions on their equity interests.26 Though most courts and com-
 
 22. Risk-averse directors may choose to resign when the business ap-
proaches the zone to avoid these additional duties. This result could be devas-
tating, since businesses approaching insolvency cannot afford additional dis-
ruptions. A duty not to resign theoretically could be imposed if the resignation 
will harm the company or leave assets unprotected. Such a duty would make 
managers liable for postresignation breaches that occurred or began before 
they resigned. Likewise, a manager ostensibly could be liable if he breached 
fiduciary duties before resigning or if any postresignation acts violate any on-
going fiduciary duties. See, e.g., Gerdes v. Reynolds, 28 N.Y.S.2d 622, 649, 651 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1941); Bruce H. White & William L. Medford, Preparing for 
Bankruptcy: Director Liability in the Zone of Insolvency, AM. BANKR. INST. J., 
Apr. 2001, at 30–31. 
 23. See Prod. Res. Group, L.L.C. v. NCT Group, Inc., 863 A.2d 772, 792 
(Del. Ch. 2004) (“[T]he fact of insolvency does not change the primary object of 
the director’s duties, which is the firm itself . ”). 
 24. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of RSL Com Primecall, Inc. v. 
Beckoff (In re RSL Com Primecall), No. 01-11457, 2003 WL 22989669, at *8 
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Dec. 11, 2003); cf. Roth v. Mims, 298 B.R. 272, 286–87 (N.D. 
Tex. 2003) (discussing the bankruptcy court’s conclusion that managers undu-
ly delayed seeking bankruptcy protection for the business). 
 25. See RSL Com Primecall, 2003 WL 22989669, at *8. 
 26. See, e.g., Unsecured Creditors Comm. of Debtor STN Enters. v. Noyes 
(In re STN Enters.), 779 F.2d 901, 904–05 (2d Cir. 1985); Miller v. Dutil (In re 
Total Containment, Inc.), 335 B.R. 589, 604 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2005); A.R. Tee-
ters & Assocs. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 836 P.2d 1034, 1043 (Ariz. Ct. App. 
1992); Rosebud Corp. v. Boggio, 561 P.2d 367, 372 (Colo. Ct. App. 1977); Geyer 
v. Ingersoll Publ’ns Co., 621 A.2d 784, 789–90 (Del. Ch. 1992); Rutheford B. 
Campbell, Jr. & Christopher W. Frost, Managers’ Fiduciary Duties in Finan-
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mentators conclude that managers owe creditors duties once 
the firm becomes insolvent,27 there is a wide range of views 
concerning when those duties shift.28 Likewise, there is a 
breadth of views concerning the scope of those postinsolvency 
fiduciary duties.29 While liability is clear where managers en-
gage in fraud, self-dealing, or preferential treatment, courts are 
split over whether the business judgment rule shields manag-
ers from liability if they are sued by creditors for breaching 
their postinsolvency duty of care.30 
 
cially Distressed Corporations: Chaos in Delaware (And Elsewhere), 32 J. 
CORP. L. 491, 493 (2007) (describing four stages of corporate financial health 
and proposing that managers owe fiduciary duties to different constituencies 
during the different stages); Henry T. C. Hu & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Ab-
olition of the Corporate Duty to Creditors, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1321, 1331–48 
(2007) (tracing the development of the duty-shifting doctrine incorporate go-
vernance and bankruptcy jurisprudence, and advocating the abolition of the 
doctrine). 
 27. But cf. Jonathan C. Lipson, Directors’ Duties to Creditors: Power Im-
balance and the Financially Distressed Corporation, 50 UCLA L. REV. 1189, 
1189 (2003) (calling into question “the widely held view that the fiduciary du-
ties that corporate directors ordinarily owe to or for the benefit of shareholders 
should ‘shift’ to creditors when the corporation is in financial distress”). Some 
suggest that directors and officers manage an insolvent firm’s assets in a trust 
for the benefit of creditors because creditors are the owners of an insolvent 
firm. See, e.g., Jewel Recovery, L.P. v. Gordon, 196 B.R. 348, 354–55 (N.D. Tex. 
1996). 
 28. See, e.g., Royce de R. Barondes, Fiduciary Duties of Officers and Direc-
tors of Distressed Corporations, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 45, 101–02 (1998); 
Campbell & Frost, supra note 26, at 494 (describing the difficulty faced by 
managers understanding their shifting duties); Hu & Westbrook, supra note 
26, at 1342–43 (noting that much of the analysis of the duty-shifting doctrine 
focuses on which financial event should trigger the shift); Harvey R. Miller, 
Corporate Governance in Chapter 11: The Fiduciary Relationship Between Di-
rectors and Stockholders of Solvent and Insolvent Corporations, 23 SETON 
HALL L. REV. 1467, 1513–15 (1993). 
 29. Some courts and commentators narrowly characterize managers’ du-
ties as the traditional preinsolvency duties (loyalty and due care) owed to 
shareholders, others suggest that they have only contractual duties (duty of 
good faith and fair dealing) to creditors, while others suggest that managers 
are required only to act legally and not divert or dissipate the firm’s assets. 
See Mosser v. Darrow, 341 U.S. 267, 274 (1951) (discussing prohibition against 
trustees allowing insiders to engage in self-interested trading); Ford Motor 
Credit Co. v. Weaver, 680 F.2d 451, 461 (6th Cir. 1982) (discussing fiduciary 
duties of due care); Steinberg v. Kendig (In re Ben Franklin Retail Stores, 
Inc.), 225 B.R. 646, 655–56 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1998); St. James Capital Corp. v. 
Pallet Recycling Assocs. of N. Am., Inc., 589 N.W.2d 511, 516 (Minn. Ct. App. 
1999); Dickerson, supra note 17, at 13, 18 n.66 (citing divergent views). 
 30. See, e.g., Bank of America v. Musselman, 222 F. Supp. 2d 792, 797, 
799 (E.D. Va. 2002) (noting that in contrast with the majority of states, the 
general rule in Virginia is that “no direct action lies to a creditor” for improper 
or failed performance of a manager’s fiduciary duties). Compare Comm. of the 
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Finally, conflict-of-interest issues increase31 when the 
managers’ duties shift at insolvency. As an initial matter, it is 
unclear whether the managers’ fiduciary duty to creditors rep-
laces or is coextensive with a duty to shareholders and others 
with an interest in the firm (including employees).32 Courts 
have split on the question of whether managers continue to 
have duties to shareholders upon insolvency.33 Again, share-
 
Creditors of Xonics Med. Sys., Inc. v. Haverty (In re Xonics, Inc.), 99 B.R. 870, 
876 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1989) (applying the business judgment rule), with Mims 
v. Kennedy Capital Mgmt., Inc. (In re Performance Nutrition, Inc.), 239 B.R. 
93, 111 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1999) (refusing to apply the rule), and Askanase v. 
Fatjo, No. H-91-3140, 1993 WL 208440, at *5 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 22, 1993) (hold-
ing that the business judgment rule “is of no effect” in insolvency proceedings), 
aff ’d, 130 F.3d 657, 658 (5th Cir. 1997). Presumably, if the duty applies, deci-
sions managers made during the firm’s insolvency will be deemed to have been 
taken in good faith as long as the directors were adequately informed and uti-
lized a rational decision-making process. 
 31. Even before insolvency, managers must consider potentially conflict-
ing interests when they make decisions since state laws prevent them from 
making distributions to stockholders if doing so would render the corporation 
insolvent or leave it with unreasonably small capital. See, e.g., Brandt v. 
Hicks, Muse & Co. (In re Healthco Int’l., Inc.), 208 B.R. 288, 301 (Bankr. D. 
Mass. 1997) (rejecting the argument that requiring directors to consider the 
interests of both groups creates an irreconcilable conflict since a “distribution 
to stockholders which renders the corporation insolvent . . . threatens the very 
existence of the corporation.”). 
 32. See Pay ’N Pak Stores v. Court Square Capital Ltd. (In re PNP Hold-
ings Corp.), No. 96-35835, 1998 WL 133560, at *4 (9th Cir. Mar. 18, 1998) (de-
clining to resolve the question of when managers’ fiduciary duty should shift 
to creditors); Clarkson Co. v. Shaheen, 660 F.2d 506, 512 (2d Cir. 1981) (noting 
that in New York, a manager’s duty to creditors arises upon insolvency); Mil-
ler v. Dutil (In re Total Containment, Inc.), 335 B.R. 589, 603–04 (Bankr. E.D. 
Pa. 2005) (indicating that a controlling shareholder may also have a fiduciary 
duty to the corporation itself and that this duty shifts to corporate creditors at 
insolvency); Ass’n of Haystack Prop. Owners v. Sprague, 494 A.2d 122, 125 
(Vt. 1985) (“[S]ome courts have held that corporate directors do owe a fidu-
ciary duty to creditors, particularly when the corporation becomes insolvent.”); 
JAMES D. COX & THOMAS L. HAZEN, CORPORATIONS § 10.14, at 217–19 (2d ed. 
2003) (discussing the body of law that imposes on directors fiduciary duties to 
creditors when the firm is insolvent); Campbell & Frost, supra note 26, at 
500–02 (describing three competing notions regarding the fiduciary duties of 
managers to shareholders and creditors upon insolvency); Remus D. Valsan & 
Moin A. Yahya, Shareholders, Creditors, and Directors’ Fiduciary Duties: A 
Law and Finance Approach, 2 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 1, 25 (2007) (noting that the 
shifting fiduciary duties of management are complicated by confusion between 
the interests of various stakeholders and of the corporation itself ). 
 33. For cases concluding that managers have no duties to shareholders at 
insolvency, see FDIC v. Sea Pines Co., 692 F.2d 973, 977 (4th Cir. 1982); Hovis 
v. Powers Constr. Co. (In re Hoffman Assocs., Inc.), 194 B.R. 943, 964 (Bankr. 
D.S.C. 1995). For cases concluding that managers have a duty to both credi-
tors and shareholders, see Ed Peters Jewelry Co. v. C & J Jewelry Co., 124 
F.3d 252, 276 (1st Cir. 1997); Butler v. Bantz (In re Howe Grain, Inc.), 209 
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holders have an incentive to encourage managers to engage in 
risky behavior to resuscitate an insolvent firm because their 
limited liability to the firm’s creditors protects them even 
though the higher-risk activities make it more likely that the 
business will lose money and ultimately be liquidated.34 Even if 
managers understand that they have a fiduciary duty to protect 
nonshareholder claims or interests, however, they may feel con-
flicting loyalties upon the firm’s insolvency, and current law 
does not clearly explain how they can simultaneously protect 
those potentially conflicting interests.35 
4. Deepening Insolvency 
Just as some courts have suggested that managers should 
have enhanced fiduciary duties when the firm is in the zone of 
insolvency, managers (or financial advisors) who fraudulently 
prolong an insolvent firm’s corporate life by causing the firm to 
unnecessarily sink deeper into debt may be sued based on the 
theory of deepening insolvency.36 This relatively new tort 
theory expands the traditional conceptualization of managers’ 
fiduciary state-law duties by penalizing managers whose frau-
dulent or negligent conduct during the zone of insolvency dam-
ages the corporation.37 
 
B.R. 496, 499 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1997); Value Prop. Trust v. Zim Co. (In re Mort-
gage & Realty Trust), 195 B.R. 740, 750–51 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1996). 
 34. See Valsan & Yahya, supra note 32, at 2–3 (“The shareholders will 
prefer that directors engage in risky projects . . . much to the chagrin of credi-
tors who would rather the directors engage in less risky activities so that they 
may recover some of their principal.”); see also Barondes, supra note 28 at 49–
50 (noting that as corporations approach insolvency, shareholders may be “es-
sentially indifferent,” since negative returns of a distressed corporation are 
“almost entirely borne by the creditor”). 
 35. In Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343 
(1985), the Supreme Court noted that shareholder interests must be subordi-
nated to creditor interests, but did not delineate the nature of the duties direc-
tors owed creditors. Id. at 355. See also In re Cent. Ice Cream Co., 836 F.2d 
1068, 1072–73 (7th Cir. 1987) (agreeing that the debtor’s primary duty was to 
ensure sufficient assets to pay creditor claims, but also considering the share-
holders’ interests in being paid). 
 36. See In re Vartec Telecom, Inc., 335 B.R. 631, 636 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 
2005) (defining deepening insolvency as the “fraudulent prolongation of a cor-
poration’s life beyond insolvency, resulting in damage to the corporation 
caused by increased debt” (citing Kittay v. Atlantic Bank of New York (In re 
Global Serv. Group, LLC), 316 B.R. 451, 456 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2004))). 
 37. For example, managers and shareholders may be liable to creditors for 
negligently increasing debt or providing misleading financial information that 
either causes creditors to extend credit or prevents creditors from being paid. 
See Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. R.F. Lafferty & Co., 267 F.3d 
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Although new, the deepening-insolvency theory of liability 
is increasingly disfavored. Courts generally have been unwil-
ling to impose liability based on this theory and also have found 
that the business judgment rule protects managers as long as 
they act in a way that benefits the corporate enterprise.38 
B. FEDERAL LAW: THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT 
State laws traditionally defined the scope of managers’ du-
ties and the civil liability they face if they violate those duties.39 
However, in response to the financial scandals involving Enron, 
WorldCom, and other large businesses,40 Congress imposed ad-
ditional duties on managers under federal law by enacting the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act.41 
 
340, 349–50 (3d Cir. 2001) (concluding that “deepening insolvency” may give 
rise to cognizable injury); Tabas v. Greenleaf Ventures, Inc. (In re Flagship 
Healthcare, Inc.), 269 B.R. 721, 732 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2001) (holding that a fi-
duciary duty was owed and breached by negligent performance of services); 
Steinberg v. Kendig (In re Ben Franklin Retail Stores, Inc.), 225 B.R. 646, 656 
(N.D. Ill. 1988) (noting that directors who cause corporations to incur unneces-
sary debt may be liable to creditors for breach of duty). 
 38. Cf. Production Resources Group, LLC v. NCT Group, Inc., 863 A.2d 
772, 793, 795 (Del. Ch. 2004) (holding that the general state statute protecting 
directors from personal liability does not insulate them with regards to “acts of 
disloyalty” to the firm). Imposing liability on managers who engage in certain 
activities (including increasing the firm’s debt) while the firm is insolvent or 
approaching insolvency is new in the United States but quite common in other 
nations. Directors in a number of countries face civil and criminal liabilities 
and may be forced to contribute their personal assets to the firm’s insolvency 
proceeding if they are found to have “traded while insolvent” or if they delay 
placing the firm in an insolvency proceeding. See A. Mechele Dickerson, The 
Many Faces of Chapter 11: A Reply to Professor Baird, 12 AM. BANKR. INST. L. 
REV. 109, 128 & n.95 (2004) (discussing liability under British, Australian, 
Canadian, and French law). For a more comprehensive discussion of director 
liability under British and Australian law, see Vanessa Finch, The Recasting 
of Insolvency Law, 68 MODERN L. REV. 713, 733–36 (2005) (discussing British 
law); Paul James et al., Insolvent Trading—An Empirical Study 4–9 (Univ. of 
Melbourne Faculty of Law, Research Paper No. 72, 2004), available at http:// 
www.ssrn.com/abstract=555892 (discussing Australian law).  
 39. See Kelli A. Alces, Moving Toward a Federal Law of Corporate Gover-
nance, 31 S. Ill. U. L.J. 621, 623 (“The internal affairs of corporations, particu-
larly those relating to corporate management, have long been the province of 
state law.”). 
 40. See The Fall of Enron: How Could It Have Happened?: Hearing Before 
the S. Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 107th Cong. 6 (2002) [hereinafter Fall 
of Enron] (statement of Sen. Levin, Member, S. Comm. on Government Af-
fairs) (“The deceptions and the accounting gimmicks, the shredding of docu-
ments that have occurred shake the very foundation of our confidence in cor-
porate America.”). 
 41. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codi-
fied in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.).  
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The Sarbanes-Oxley Act alters managers’ duties and ex-
pands the authority of federal agencies and courts to regulate 
managers’ powers and duties.42 To a great extent, Sarbanes-
Oxley focuses on changing the “tone at the top” and revises ex-
isting law to impose more penalties on directors or officers who 
set the wrong tone.43 The Act substantively regulates the quali-
fication criteria for directors, defines and increases the duties of 
directors who sit on certain board committees, and restricts the 
relationships directors can have with the firm’s officers, em-
ployees, lawyers, accountants, and other professionals.44 The 
Act also enhances (and, to some extent, federalizes) state corpo-
rate-governance laws based on the premise that federal law 
needs to respond to managers’ conduct, since managers are at 
least partially to blame for the financial demise of firms.45 
 
 42. See Lisa M. Fairfax, Spare the Rod, Spoil the Director? Revitalizing 
Directors’ Fiduciary Duty Through Legal Liability, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 393, 394, 
397–402 (2005) (discussing the “federalization” of directors’ duty of care). 
 43. See Implementation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002: Hearing Before 
the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 108th Cong. 35 (2003) 
(statement of William H. Donaldson, Chairman, Securities and Exchange 
Commission). Sarbanes-Oxley’s principal objectives “can be grouped into the 
following themes: to strengthen and restore confidence in the accounting pro-
fession; to strengthen enforcement of the Federal securities laws; to improve 
the ‘tone at the top’ and executive responsibility; to improve disclosure and fi-
nancial reporting; and to improve the performance of ‘gatekeepers.’” Id. 
 44. For example, the Act requires that the audit committee consist of in-
dependent directors who essentially receive no compensation from the firm 
except for directors’ fees. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 301. The Act requires the 
audit committee to appoint the firm’s auditors, supervise the audit, receive the 
auditor’s report, and establish an anonymous method for whistleblowers to 
reveal suspicious accounting practices. See id. It also restricts the types of re-
lationships accountants and attorneys can have. See id. § 201. The Act primar-
ily focuses on the firm’s reporting obligations and is designed to ensure that 
the company’s financial statements are both technically accurate and not ma-
terially misleading. See, e.g., id. § 302 (requiring signing officers to maintain 
internal controls and to certify that they have disclosed any fraud or deficien-
cies therein). The Act also significantly alters the duties and qualifications of 
directors who serve on the firm’s audit committee. Id. §§ 304, 306, 403, 906. As 
a result, companies now routinely employ a corporate governance officer, or 
CGO, to oversee their corporate governance programs. See Heather Brewer, 
Snap Judgments: Add a Dash of CGO, BUS. L. TODAY, Sept.–Oct. 2003, at 7 
(citing the examples of Tyco International and Walt Disney). The Act also di-
rects the Securities and Exchange Commission to promulgate rules and regu-
lations to require public companies to disclose whether they have a code of eth-
ics for senior financial officers and if not, to explain why they do not have one. 
See Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 406. 
 45. See Fall of Enron, supra note 40, at 5 (statement of Sen. Thompson, 
Member, S. Comm. on Government Affairs) (citing the problems caused by 
“unscrupulous corporate executive[s]”); id. at 11 (statement of Sen. Durbin, 
Member, S. Comm. on Government Affairs) (noting the responsibility of “cor-
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II. MANAGER CONTROL IN BANKRUPTCY CASES  
A. STATUTORY OUSTER OF MANAGERS 
Bankruptcy laws have vacillated between presumptively 
displacing the firm’s managers with a public trustee and pre-
sumptively giving those managers control of the firm in bank-
ruptcy reorganizations. In all instances, however, the entity 
that is given control of the firm in the reorganization acts for 
the benefit of all interested parties, and has a duty to protect 
those interests in the bankruptcy proceeding. 
1. Bankruptcy Act 
Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898,46 as amended by 
the Chandler Act in 1938, mandated automatic replacement of 
large public companies’ existing managers with a disinterested, 
independent trustee who would operate the business if the 
debts of the business exceeded $250,000.47 The trustee was re-
quired to assess the debtor’s property, liabilities, and financial 
condition and to investigate the debtor’s acts and conduct to de-
termine how best to formulate a plan of reorganization or how 
best to discontinue the business.48 It was imperative that the 
trustee be disinterested, since the trustee’s duties included ex-
amining the debtor’s prefiling management team, deciding 
whether the firm had been mismanaged or whether managers 
had engaged in fraud, and investigating other financial or op-
erational irregularities.49 
 
porate insiders at Enron”); The Role of the Board of Directors in Enron’s Col-
lapse: Hearing Before the Perm. Subcomm. of Investigations of the S. Comm. 
on Gov’t Affairs, 107th Cong. 3–4 (2002) (statement of Sen. Levin, Chairman, 
Perm. Subcomm. on Investigations of the S. Comm. on Gov’t Affairs) (discuss-
ing the role Enron’s board of directors played as a “facilitator” in accommodat-
ing unethical managers); see also William B. Chandler III & Leo E. Strine, Jr., 
The New Federalism of the American Corporate Governance System: Prelimi-
nary Reflections of Two Residents of One Small State, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 953, 
953–57, 971–72 (2003) (noting, for example, the Act’s prohibition against cor-
porations making loans to managers).  
 46. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, Pub. L. No. 55-171, 30 Stat. 544 (repealed 
1978). 
 47. Chandler Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-696, § 575, 52 Stat. 840, 888 (re-
pealed 1978); see generally DAVID A. SKEEL, JR., DEBT’S DOMINION 119–20 
(2001) (discussing the role of the trustee in Chapter X of the Chandler Act). 
 48. See Chandler Act, § 167(1)–(5). 
 49. See Myron N. Krotinger, Management and Allocation of Voting Power 
in Corporate Reorganizations, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 646, 651 (1941). In addition, 
Krotinger discusses Congress’s desire to “rid the debtor of personnel whose 
past activities indicated a high probability of continued inefficiency or disre-
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Managers received radically different treatment if the firm 
filed for relief under Chapter XI of the Act, which was designed 
to be used by individuals, partnerships, smaller firms, and 
firms that had little secured debt.50 In Chapter XI, a public 
trustee was not required and the existing managers retained 
the right to control the business operations and the restructur-
ing process, including the right to propose a plan of reorganiza-
tion.51 Chapter XI also did not mandate that the entity who 
controlled the reorganization proceeding investigate the deb-
tor’s affairs to determine whether management engaged in 
fraud, misconduct, irregular conduct, or otherwise mismanaged 
the firm.52 
Congress determined that managers should not be left in 
control during the reorganization proceeding because they 
would have no incentive to scrutinize their own conduct, bring 
lawsuits that might reveal that they had engaged in miscon-
duct, or provide a complete accounting of the firm’s financial 
picture.53 By ousting senior managers, Congress presumed that 
the managers of large businesses were disregarding their fidu-
ciary duties and were generally responsible for firms’ financial 
problems, and that allowing them to keep their jobs openly in-
vited them to continue harming the firm, its creditors, and its 
investors.54 However, in subsequent years the policy of auto-
matically ousting experienced managers was criticized, because 
it hampered firms’ ability to reorganize successfully and effi-
ciently.55 Critics argued that, unlike the existing managers, 
 
gard of fiduciary duty.” Id. 
 50. See Bankruptcy Act Revision: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Civil 
and Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong. 
2164, 2172–73 (1976) (report of Securities and Exchange Comm’n on Proposed 
Bankr. Leg. (H.R. 31 and H.R. 32)) (describing differences between Chapters X 
and XI). 
 51. See H.R. DOC. NO. 93-137, pt. I, at 244, 247 (1973) (“Control belongs to 
the debtor in Chapter XI.”). 
 52. See H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 233 (1977), as reprinted in 1978 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6182 (“[F]or a small business there was felt to be no need 
for a trustee to investigate the affairs of the debtor . . . .”). 
 53. Krotinger, supra note 49, at 650–61. 
 54. See H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 232 (noting that the requirement of a 
trustee under the Bankruptcy Act of 1938 was a reaction to the widespread 
fraud and dishonesty of management, which often led the business into bank-
ruptcy); Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Corporate Governance in the 
Bankruptcy of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 669, 674 
(1993) (discussing how the SEC sought to diminish the role of “self-serving” 
corporate managers in the 1938 Act). 
 55. See H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 233 (“[V]ery often, the creditors will be 
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public trustees needed time to become familiar with the busi-
ness and its operations and that it was inefficient for an inex-
perienced public trustee to focus on rehabilitating the debtor.56 
The harsh treatment managers received in Chapter X dis-
couraged managers from using that Chapter and ultimately 
caused Chapter XI to become the dominant reorganization ve-
hicle for even large, publicly traded companies that ostensibly 
should have filed under the trustee-controlled Chapter X.57 In-
deed, Chapter X’s trustee-controlled procedures increasingly 
became unworkable because the managers of larger businesses 
filed under Chapter XI, avoided filing for bankruptcy altogeth-
er, or delayed filing until the firm’s financial condition was 
beyond repair.58 Congress responded to the increasingly nega-
tive consequences associated with Chapter X’s automatic ouster 
of management by combining the previous acts into one reor-
ganization chapter and establishing a presumption that the 
firm’s prebankruptcy managers would retain control of firms 
seeking to reorganize in bankruptcy.59 
 
benefited by continuation of the debtor in possession [since the debtor] will be 
better able to operate [the business] during the reorganization case.”). 
 56. See id. 
 57. See Bankruptcy Reform Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Im-
provements in Judiciary Machinery of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th 
Cong. 709 (1975) (statement of Philip A. Loomis, Commissioner, Securities 
and Exchange Commission); H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 222 (“[I]n spite of the 
original intention of the authors of [C]hapter XI, it is used as often by large 
public companies as by small private ones.”); id. at 233 (“One of the main rea-
sons that debtors use [C]hapter XI so much more frequently than [C]hapter X 
is because they know they will not be ousted of possession and operation of the 
business.”); SKEEL, supra note 47, at 162 (discussing the incentives for man-
agers of distressed firms to file under Chapter XI). In fact, the Act contained 
no explicit requirement that large companies use Chapter X. Instead, the 
standard for courts in determining whether a case should be filed under Chap-
ter X or Chapter XI was “the needs to be served.” Gen. Stores Corp. v. 
Shlensky, 350 U.S. 462, 466 (1956).  
 58. See H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 223, 233–34 (noting that debtors “too of-
ten wait too long to seek bankruptcy relief ”); see also SKEEL, supra note 47, at 
125; Donald R. Korobkin, The Unwarranted Case Against Corporate Reorgani-
zation: A Reply to Bradley and Rosenzweig, 78 IOWA L. REV. 669, 674–75 
(1993). 
 59. See Korobkin, supra note 58, at 674 (discussing the “unified Chapter 
11” under the 1978 Bankruptcy Code). For a discussion of the debate before 
Congress among creditors, lawyers, and bankruptcy judges on allowing man-
agers to retain control of the bankruptcy process, see SKEEL, supra note 47, at 
177–78. 
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2. Bankruptcy Code 
The Bankruptcy Code replaced the Act and rejects the 
manager-displacing/trustee-controlled model. Chapter 11 
creates a new entity, the debtor-in-possession (DIP), and gives 
control of the Chapter 11 firm to existing managers.60 While a 
public trustee can still be appointed to replace management,61 
Chapter 11 reverses the presumption that the court will replace 
managers with a public trustee. Instead, the Code creates a 
presumption that existing managers will control the business 
during the reorganization process.62 
While the SEC continued to assume that firms filed for 
bankruptcy because of “the failure of the management and its 
methods,”63 Congress concluded that replacing the Act’s trus-
tee-controlled regime with a manager-controlled regime makes 
it more likely that viable companies will successfully reorganize 
and not be forced to liquidate.64 The decision to replace the 
Act’s trustee-controlled regime with a manager-controlled re-
gime seems to have resulted from the conclusion that most fi-
nancial failures are caused by factors that have little to do with 
the management skills or capabilities of the firm’s managers.65 
 
 60. See 11 U.S.C. § 1107(a) (2000). 
 61. See id. § 1104(a)(1)–(3) (2000 & Supp. 2006). 
 62. See id. § 1107(a). 
 63. Bankruptcy Act Revision: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Civil and 
Constitutional Rights of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong. 2177 
(1976) (report of Securities and Exchange Comm’n on Proposed Bankr. Leg. 
(H.R. 31 and H.R. 32)). 
 64. See H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 233 (1977), as reprinted in 1978 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6182 (stating that as a result of the manager’s greater fa-
miliarity with the business, “a debtor continued in possession may lead to a 
greater likelihood of success in the reorganization”). However, this manager-
controlled model, though now dominant in the United States, is not the only 
insolvency model. The insolvency laws of a number of countries are similar to 
the 1898 and 1938 Bankruptcy Acts in that they replace management with a 
court-appointed administrator or provisional liquidator as soon as the firm 
files for relief in an insolvency proceeding. See Harvey R. Miller, The Chang-
ing Face of Chapter 11: A Reemergence of the Bankruptcy Judge as Producer, 
Director, and Sometimes Star of the Reorganization Passion Play, 69 AM. 
BANKR. L.J. 431, 444 (1995). For a comparative overview of international mod-
els and discussion of the impact of U.S. bankruptcy law, see Alan Tilley, ‘U.S. 
Invasion’ Influences European Insolvency Practices: Major Hurdles Remain to 
Chapter 11-Type Restructurings, J. CORP. RENEWAL, Sep. 2004, at 4, available 
at http://www.turnaround.org/Publications/Articles.aspx?objectID=3650. 
 65. See H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 233 (“[T]he need for reorganization . . . 
often results from simple business reverses, not from any fraud, dishonesty, or 
gross mismanagement on the part of the debtor’s management.”); see also 
SKEEL, supra note 47, at 178 (discussing the view that managers should not be 
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Presumptively retaining existing managers removes the disin-
centive (i.e., the fear of being fired) managers had to avoid 
bankruptcy until the firm was hopelessly insolvent; theoretical-
ly, this should result in more efficient restructurings.66 
The DIP has most of the statutory rights and duties of a 
statutory trustee.67 It does not have the right to be compen-
sated. Not surprisingly, it also has no duty to investigate man-
ager misconduct, competence, or mismanagement. The DIP os-
tensibly has the same fiduciary duties as a public, statutory 
trustee,68 though the Code fails explicitly to impose those du-
ties on the DIP69 and does not delineate exactly what those du-
ties would be.70 While courts have not precisely defined the pa-
 
displaced if the firm’s financial distress was due to circumstances beyond the 
control of the managers (citing Bankruptcy Reform Act: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Improvements in Judiciary Machinery of the S. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 94th Cong. 650 (1975) (statement of John J. Creedon, American 
Life Insurance Ass’n))). 
 66. See H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 233; see also NAT’L BANKR. CONFE-
RENCE’S CODE REVIEW PROJECT, REFORMING THE BANKRUPTCY CODE, i–xv 
(1994) (providing an overview of changes to the bankruptcy code); Miller, su-
pra, note 64, at 446–47 (citing 140 CONG. REC. S14,464 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1994) 
(statement of Sen. Brown)); Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policymaking in an 
Imperfect World, 92 MICH. L. REV. 336, 372 (1993).  
 67. DIP manager powers include the right to control the debtor’s business 
operations during the reorganization, the ability to control the flow of informa-
tion to creditors during the reorganization process, the right to recover certain 
funds from creditors or to avoid certain transactions on behalf of the DIP, and 
the right to determine the type of reorganization plan that can be submitted 
during the first few months of the case. See 11 U.S.C. § 1107 (2000) (giving the 
DIP all the rights, powers, and duties of trustee except those specifically ex-
cluded by statute); id. § 1108 (providing the DIP the right to operate the deb-
tor’s business); id. § 1121(b) (affording the debtor the exclusive right to file 
plan for first 120 days after the petition is filed); id. § 544 (granting the DIP 
the right to avoid certain liens); cf. Karen Gross & Patricia Redmond, In De-
fense of Debtor Exclusivity: Assessing Four of the 1994 Amendments to the 
Bankruptcy Code, 69 AM. BANKR. L.J. 287, 290–91 (1995) (discussing the role 
of debtor exclusivity). 
 68. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 
355 (1985); In re Marvel Entm’t Group, Inc., 140 F.3d 463, 474 (3d Cir. 1998); 
Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Weaver, 680 F.2d 451, 461 (6th Cir. 1982). 
 69. Compare 11 U.S.C. § 1106(a)(3) (2000 & Supp. 2006) (stating that 
trustees have such a duty), with id. § 1107(a) (stating that DIPs do not have 
such a duty). 
 70. Since the Code does not prescribe the duties, they are ostensibly based 
on state corporate law or federal common law. See C.R. Bowles, Jr. & Nancy B. 
Rapoport, Has the DIP’s Attorney Become the Ultimate Creditors’ Lawyer in 
Bankruptcy Reorganization Cases?, 5 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 47, 52–57 
(1997). Others argue that the DIP should have a more stringent standard, 
akin to the duties imposed on trustees under nonbankruptcy law. See Daniel 
B. Bogart, Liability of Directors of Chapter 11 Debtors in Possession: “Don’t 
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rameters of the DIP’s fiduciary duties, most conclude that the 
DIP has the same fiduciary duties of care and loyalty to the es-
tate, its creditors, shareholders, and other parties-in-interest 
that the firm’s managers had prepetition.71 Courts further con-
clude that the DIP (and thus its managers) must preserve and 
protect property of the bankruptcy estate and must refrain 
from acting in ways that would damage the estate or harm the 
firm’s reorganization efforts.72 
Managers cannot simply advance one party’s interests to 
the exclusion of others. Courts generally have found that the 
DIP must treat all parties fairly and cannot favor any one con-
stituent, such as secured or unsecured creditors, tort claimants, 
shareholders, or employees.73 Instead, managers must consider 
the impact that any decision they make during the reorganiza-
tion might have on other constituents even if the favored consti-
tuent has rights that have a higher priority under state law.74 
 
Look Back—Something May Be Gaining on You,” 68 AM. BANKR. L.J. 155, 
221–31 (1994) (arguing that bankruptcy courts use stringent standards for 
DIPs). This type of standard would require the DIP to disclose significantly 
more information to parties in interest. Additionally, the DIP would not be 
protected by the business judgment rule even for breaches of the duty of care. 
See id.; Bowles & Rapoport, supra, at 55–57. 
 71. See Lange v. Schropp (In re Brook Valley VII), 496 F.3d 892, 900–01 
(8th Cir. 2007); In re Marvel Entm’t Group, Inc., 140 F.3d at 471; In re WBE 
Co., No. BK06-80006, 2007 WL 4893471 (Bankr. D. Neb. Dec. 19, 2007); 
Comm. of Creditors Holding Unsecured Claims v. Citicorp Venture Capital, 
Ltd. (In re Papercraft Corp.), 187 B.R. 486, 498–500 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1995), 
rev’d on other grounds, 211 B.R. 813 (W.D. Pa. 1997) (rejecting a per se rule 
that insiders cannot purchase claims from debtors without disclosing informa-
tion); First Union Nat’l Bank v. Tenn-Fla Partners (In re Tenn-Fla Partners), 
170 B.R. 946, 968 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1994), aff ’d in part, rev’d in part on oth-
er grounds, 229 B.R. 720, (W.D. Tenn. 1999) (reversing the bankruptcy court’s 
determination that no compensatory damages were warranted); In re Harp, 
166 B.R. 740, 746–48 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1993). See generally 1 COLLIER ON 
BANKRUPTCY ¶ 8.01[3][b] (Lawrence P. King ed., 15th ed. 2008) (describing 
the fiduciary duty of the DIP and the attorney). 
 72. See In re Marvel Entm’t Group, Inc., 140 F.3d at 471; Unsecured Cred-
itors Comm. of Debtor STN Enters. v. Noyes (In re STN Enters.), 779 F.2d 
901, 904–05 (2d Cir. 1985); Berres v. Bruning (In re Bruning), 143 B.R. 253, 
255–56 (D. Colo. 1992); Steinberg v. Kendig (In re Ben Franklin Retail Stores, 
Inc.), 225 B.R. 646, 653–54 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1998); Pacificorp Ky. Energy 
Corp. v. Big Rivers Elec. Corp. (In re Big Rivers Elec. Corp.), 233 B.R. 726, 
734–35 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1998), aff ’d, 233 B.R. 739 (W.D. Ky. 1998); In re Io-
nosphere Clubs, Inc., 113 B.R. 164, 169 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990); In re Sharon 
Steel Corp., 86 B.R. 455, 457 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1988), aff ’d, 871 F.2d 1217 (3d 
Cir. 1989). 
 73. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. Raytech Corp. (In re Raytech 
Corp.), 190 B.R. 149, 151–52 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1995). 
 74. See In re Cent. Ice Cream Co., 836 F.2d 1068, 1072–73 (7th Cir. 1987); 
 894 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [93:875 
 
Notwithstanding the general understanding that the DIP 
and its managers owe fiduciary duties to creditors and must 
pay creditor claims before distributing property to owners, 
those fiduciary duties during bankruptcy cases are ill-defined.75 
This is perhaps not surprising, since managers’ duties to credi-
tors and shareholders during the firm’s prepetition insolvency 
(or near insolvency) phase also are not clear.76 One thing, how-
ever, is clear: the people who have control of the firm in bank-
ruptcy must be independent, impartial, and, if they are re-
tained as “professionals,” must disclose all relationships they 
have with other parties in interest in the Chapter 11 case.77 
B. RETAINING AND REPLACING MANAGERS 
1. Professionals 
Attorneys, accountants, consultants and other profession-
als can be hired under § 327 of the Code as long as the profes-
sional is disinterested and holds no interest that is adverse to 
 
Comm. of Equity Sec. Holders v. Lionel Corp. (In re Lionel Corp.), 722 F.2d 
1063, 1070–71 (2d Cir. 1983); Hall v. Perry (In re Cochise Coll. Park, Inc.), 703 
F.2d 1339, 1357 (9th Cir. 1983). 
 75. Some courts suggest that the DIP’s or trustee’s attorneys also have fi-
duciary duties to creditors and shareholders. Zeisler & Zeisler, P.C. v. Pruden-
tial Ins. Co. of Am. (In re JLM, Inc.), 210 B.R. 19, 25–26 (B.A.P. 2d Cir. 1997); 
In re Rancourt, 207 B.R. 338, 359–60 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1997); see Everett v. Pe-
rez (In re Perez), 30 F.3d 1209, 1219 (9th Cir. 1994). But cf. Hansen, Jones & 
Leta, P.C. v. Segal, 220 B.R. 434, 461 (D. Utah 1998) (refusing to find that 
counsel owed fiduciary duties to creditors and shareholders). If this duty exists 
it requires counsel to exhibit an “active” concern for the interests of creditors 
and shareholders if the managers engage in fraudulent or otherwise improper 
conduct that harms those interests or if managers fail to satisfy their fiduciary 
duties to the estate. See, e.g., Jenson v. U.S. Tr. (In re Smitty’s Truck Stop, 
Inc.), 210 B.R. 844, 848–49 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 1997); In re Harp, 166 B.R. 740, 
747–48 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1993); Agresti v. Rosenkranz (In re United Utensils 
Corp.), 141 B.R. 306, 309 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1992); In re Wilde Horse Enters., 
136 B.R. 830, 840 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1991); Robb v. Sowers (In re Sowers), 97 
B.R. 480, 488 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1989); In re Consupak, Inc., 87 B.R. 529, 549 
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1988). 
 76. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 
355 (1985) (stating that the DIP owes a fiduciary duty to stockholders, yet fail-
ing to explain how to reconcile this duty with the fiduciary duties owed to 
creditors); In re DN Assocs., 144 B.R. 195, 199–201 (Bankr. D. Me. 1992) (al-
lowing counsel to be compensated from the bankruptcy estate if efforts were 
undertaken in good faith), aff ’d, 160 B.R. 195 (D. Me. 1993), aff ’d, 3 F.3d 512 
(1st Cir. 1993); Martin J. Bienenstock, Conflicts Between Management and the 
Debtor in Possession’s Fiduciary Duties, 61 U. CIN. L. REV. 543, 543 n.2 (1992) 
(discussing inherent conflicts raised when a DIP is required to act on behalf of 
multiple parties who have conflicting interests). 
 77. 11 U.S.C. § 327(a) (2000). 
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the estate.78 A professional cannot be disinterested if she is a 
creditor or insider of the debtor or if she served as a director, 
officer, or employee of the debtor within the two years preced-
ing the filing of the bankruptcy petition.79 The disinterested-
ness standard is designed to prohibit conflicts of interest by en-
suring the independence and impartiality of the professional to 
be retained. Most courts conclude that the disinterestedness 
requirement includes the duty to avoid even the appearance of 
a conflict of interest.80 Thus, professionals hired in bankruptcy 
cases should not have even a “scintilla of personal interest” 
that might affect their ability to make impartial and indepen-
dent decisions during the reorganization.81 
The Code also provides, in language similar to state law 
conflicts rules, that a professional cannot hold or represent “an 
interest materially adverse to the interest of the estate or of 
any class of creditors or equity security holders . . . .”82 While 
“adverse interest” is not defined in the Bankruptcy Code, courts 
have interpreted it to mean either “(1) the possession or asser-
tion of any economic interest that would tend to lessen the val-
ue of the bankruptcy estate or create an actual or potential dis-
pute with the estate as a rival claimant, or (2) a predisposition 
of bias against the estate.”83 Thus, attorneys or professionals 
who have worked for the debtor before the filing often are dis-
qualified from being hired as professionals in the debtor’s 
bankruptcy case because they are owed funds and thus are 
creditors; they have a right of indemnification against the deb-
 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. § 101(14). 
 80. Smith v. Marshall (In re Hot Tin Roof Inc.), 205 B.R. 1000, 1003 
(B.A.P. 1st Cir. 1997); In re Vebeliunas, 231 B.R. 181, 191–93 (Bankr. 
S.D.N.Y. 1999); In re Kendavis Indus. Int’l, 91 B.R. 742, 753–54 (Bankr. N.D. 
Tex. 1988); In re Codesco, 18 B.R. 997, 999–1000 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982). 
 81. In re Vebeliunas, 231 B.R. at 191–93; In re Codesco, 18 B.R. at 999, 
quoted in In re Martin, 817 F.2d 175, 181 (1st Cir. 1987); see also In re Granite 
Partners, 219 B.R. 22, 33 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1998); In re Roberts, 46 B.R. 815, 
828 n.26 (Bankr. D. Utah 1985) (quoting In re Phila. Athletic Club, Inc., 20 
B.R. 328, 333–34 (E.D. Pa. 1982)), aff ’d in part, rev’d in part on other grounds, 
75 B.R. 402 (D. Utah 1987); 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 71, 
¶ 327.04[3]. 
 82. 11 U.S.C. § 101(14)(C). While some state law versions of the Model 
Code of Professional Responsibility or Model Rules of Professional Conduct 
allow attorneys to represent clients who have adverse interests as long as each 
party consents, the Code does not allow such waivers of conflicts. See MODEL 
RULES OF PROF ’L CONDUCT R. 1.7(b) (2002); MODEL CODE OF PROF ’L RESPON-
SIBILITY Canon 5 (1980). 
 83. In re Vebeliunas, 231 B.R. at 188 (citations omitted). 
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tor because they served as officers of the company; or because 
their prepetition engagement letters with the debtor contained 
an indemnification clause.84 A professional person who worked 
for the debtor prepetition can be employed for a specified spe-
cial purpose, but only if it is in the best interest of the estate 
and the person does not represent or hold any interest that is 
adverse to the debtor’s estate.85 Similarly, a professional person 
who is employed by or represents a creditor in a matter unre-
lated to the bankruptcy case is disqualified from being hired by 
the DIP or trustee if the person has an actual conflict of inter-
est.86 
A person employed as a professional under § 327 must ap-
ply to receive compensation under § 330.87 All parties in inter-
est have the opportunity to object to the fee application, and the 
bankruptcy court must approve the request to be compen-
sated.88 In addition, Bankruptcy Rule 2014 requires profession-
al persons to disclose their “connections with the debtor, credi-
tors, any other party in interest, [and] their respective 
attorneys and accountants.”89 Persons seeking to be hired as 
professionals must disclose all connections they have with par-
 
 84. Avellino & Bienes v. M. Frenville Co. (In re M. Frenville Co.), 744 F.2d 
332, 336–37 (3d Cir. 1984); In re Mid-Am. Waste Sys., Inc., 228 B.R. 816, 821–
22 (Bankr. D. Del. 1999); In re Consol. Oil & Gas, Inc., 110 B.R. 535, 538 
(Bankr. D. Colo. 1990); In re Amfesco Indus., 81 B.R. 777, 781–82 (Bankr. 
E.D.N.Y. 1988). Some courts hold that the professional can be employed by the 
debtor if it agrees to waive its prepetition claim, though others adopted a per 
se rule against employing prepetition professionals. In re LKM Indus., 252 
B.R. 589, 595 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2000); In re Marion Carefree Ltd. P’ship, 171 
B.R. 584, 590 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1994). 
 85. 11 U.S.C. § 327(a). 
 86. See id. § 327(a), (c). For example, an attorney who represents a credi-
tor in a matter unrelated to the bankruptcy likely could be hired as a profes-
sional in the debtor’s bankruptcy case unless another creditor or the United 
States trustee (a unit of the Justice Department that generally oversees dis-
putes involving professional fees) objects and the court finds that the attorney 
has an actual conflict of interest. See In re Enron Corp., No. 01-16034, 2002 
WL 32034346, at *7 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. May 23, 2002) (finding no actual “ad-
verse interest” under § 327(a) in conjunction with other Code provisions), 
aff ’d, 2003 WL 223455 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 3, 2003); In re Caldor, Inc., 193 B.R. 
165, 170–71, 174 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1996) (same); Michael P. Richman, Mega-
case Conflict Issues: Enron Committee Counsel, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Sept. 
2002, at 20, 20 (reiterating that “representation of other creditors is not a per 
se basis for disqualification”). 
 87. FED. R. BANKR. P. 2016(a). 
 88. See 11 U.S.C. § 330(a)(1) (2000 & Supp. 2006) (providing for notice to 
the parties in interest and a hearing to determine the proper level of compen-
sation). 
 89. FED. R. BANKR. P. 2014(a). 
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ties in interest in the case even if those connections would not 
implicate the disinterestedness or adverse interest require-
ments contained in § 327.90 Neither the Code nor the Rules de-
fine “connections.”91 As a result, this discourages lawyers and 
other professionals from fully disclosing their relationships 
with other professionals involved in a bankruptcy case.92 
2. Officers 
Entities can also be hired as officers and subject to § 363 of 
the Code. Section 363 gives the trustee the authority to use, 
sell, or lease property of the estate “other than in the ordinary 
course of business” only “after notice and hearing.”93 Bankrupt-
cy judges typically defer to a debtor’s decision to use property in 
the ordinary course of business and will permit such a use, 
sale, or lease under § 363 as long as the debtor exercised proper 
business judgment in good faith upon a reasonable basis and 
within the scope of authority under the Bankruptcy Code.”94 
Courts interpret § 363(b) liberally to allow bankruptcy 
judges to respond most effectively to the myriad circumstances 
involved in business reorganizations and to avoid imposing 
“unnecessarily rigid rules” on the judge.95 Further, courts per-
mit the DIP to use § 363, as well as other Code provisions, to 
retain the managers it regularly employed before filing for 
bankruptcy and to enter into new contracts with senior manag-
ers without having to seek court approval.96 Unlike profession-
 
 90. Cf. id. (creating no distinctions among connections that must be dis-
closed and those that do not). 
 91. Cf. Michael P. Richman, Disclose (Publish) or Perish, Revisited, AM. 
BANKR. INST. J., Apr. 2006, at 18, 18 (asserting that “connections” are not de-
fined in the Rules, and are instead determined on a case-by-case basis). 
 92. See id. at 18, 65 (discussing the high-profile failure of a law firm to 
reveal the connections it had with another entity retained in the Adelphia 
bankruptcy case and the economic and reputational consequences of that fail-
ure). 
 93. 11 U.S.C. § 363(b) (2000 & Supp. 2006). 
 94. See, e.g., In re Nellson Nutraceutical, Inc., 369 B.R. 787, 799 (Bankr. 
D. Del. 2007). But see Mission Iowa Wind Co. v. Enron Corp., 291 B.R. 39, 43 
(S.D.N.Y. 2003) (finding such deference inappropriate under the circums-
tances of that case). 
 95. Comm. of Equity Sec. Holders v. Lionel Corp. (In re Lionel Corp.), 722 
F.2d 1063, 1069 (2d Cir. 1983). 
 96. Cf. In re Madison Mgmt. Group, Inc., 137 B.R. 275, 283 (Bankr. N.D. 
Ill. 1992) (asserting that retention of professionals is allowed under § 327(b)); 
In re All Seasons Indus., Inc., 121 B.R. 822, 825–26 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1990) 
(characterizing retention of management as part of “ordinary . . . operations”); 
In re Phoenix Steel Corp., 110 B.R. 141, 142 (Bankr. D. Del. 1989) (asserting 
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als employed under § 327, officers employed in the ordinary 
course of the debtor’s business are not required to seek ongoing 
court approval for their fees, and other parties in interest have 
no right to object to their salary.97 A few courts have, however, 
found it necessary to review the reasonableness of the compen-
sation paid to officers even when the officer was not hired un-
der § 327.98 
C. APPOINTING A STATUTORY TRUSTEE 
Though the Code provides that managers can be replaced 
or supervised by a public trustee, trustee appointments are, 
and always have been, rare.99 A party in interest can seek to 
have existing managers replaced by a public trustee if the 
managers have engaged in fraudulent or dishonest conduct, are 
incompetent, or if appointing a trustee is in the best interest of 
creditors, investors, or other parties in interest.100 Responding 
largely to the Enron and WorldCom scandals, Congress has 
made it easier to displace managers. Managers are now repla-
ceable by a statutory trustee “for cause” if they are found to be 
fraudulent, dishonest, or incompetent, or to have grossly mis-
managed the company.101 In addition, pursuant to the 2005 
 
that retention is allowed under § 327(b)); Allison K. Verderber Herriott, Com-
ment, Toward an Understanding of the Dialectical Tensions Inherent in CEO 
and Key Employee Retention Plans During Bankruptcy, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 579, 
586 n.59 (2004) (suggesting that debtors use at least three provisions of the 
Code to justify retention and/or compensation plans and providing examples). 
 97. See In re Pac. Forest Indus., Inc., 95 B.R. 740, 743 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 
1989). But cf. Madison Mgmt. Group, Inc., 137 B.R. at 284 (suggesting that a 
court can review officer salaries using its equitable powers under § 105(a) of 
the Code). 
 98. In re eToys, Inc., 331 B.R. 176, 201 (Bankr. D. Del. 2005); cf. Phoenix 
Steel, 110 B.R. at 142–43 (finding it necessary to review compensation for a 
retained officer who, while professionals, were not hired under § 327(a)). 
 99. See In re Marvel Entm’t Group, Inc., 140 F.3d 463, 471 (3d Cir. 1998); 
In re SunCruz Casinos, LLC, 298 B.R. 821, 828 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2003) (citing 
In re Sharon Steel Corp., 871 F.2d 1217, 1225 (3d Cir. 1989)); In re Hawaiian 
Airlines, Inc., No. 03-00817, 2003 WL 22945906, at *5 (Bankr. D. Haw. May 
16, 2003) (holding that the appointment of a trustee was an extraordinary re-
medy, but appointing a trustee).  
 100. See 11 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (2000 & Supp. 2006). Most courts conclude 
that the standard should be clear and convincing evidence. See, e.g., Official 
Comm. of Asbestos Claimants v. G-I Holdings, Inc. (In re G-I Holdings, Inc.), 
295 B.R. 502, 507 (D.N.J. 2003), aff ’d, 385 F.3d 313 (3d Cir. 2004); In re Nar-
tron Corp., 330 B.R. 573, 591 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2005); Official Comm. of As-
bestos Pers. Injury Claimants v. Sealed Air Corp. (In re W.R. Grace & Co.), 
285 B.R. 148, 157 (Bankr. D. Del. 2002). 
 101. 11 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1). 
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amendments, if there are grounds to convert or dismiss the 
Chapter 11 case, but “appointment of a trustee . . . is in the best 
interest of creditors and the estate,” then the court is also re-
quired to appoint a trustee.102 
The required showing of ineptitude or incompetence to ap-
point a statutory trustee is high. Courts typically require the 
party seeking the appointment of a trustee to prove such ele-
ments as managers intentionally seeking to deceive creditors, a 
complete lack of business acumen or ability, or such ineptitude 
that allowing them to remain in control of the company would 
cause harm.103 Courts will also appoint a trustee if there has 
been a complete loss of confidence in the managers’ ability to 
run the business or if there are irreconcilable conflicts between 
the managers, or between the managers and other parties in 
interest.104 Courts will not replace managers for mere misma-
nagement or poor business planning;105 in fact, courts presume 
 
 102. Id. § 1104(a)(3); see also Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer 
Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 442(b), 119 Stat. 23, 116 (codified 
as amended in scattered sections of 11, 12, 18, and 28 U.S.C.). 
 103. See In re Euro-American Lodging Corp., 365 B.R. 421, 426–27 (Bankr. 
S.D.N.Y. 2007) (finding gross mismanagement when debtor had not filed tax 
returns in six years and had been stripped of authority to do business); In re 
New Orleans Paddlewheels, Inc., 350 B.R. 667, 691–92 (Bankr. E.D. La. 2006) 
(finding intentional dishonesty); In re Mako, Inc., 102 B.R. 809, 812 (Bankr. 
E.D. Okla. 1988) (requiring extreme ineptitude); In re Sharon Steel Corp., 86 
B.R. 455, at 458 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1988), aff ’d, 871 F.2d 1217 (3d Cir. 1989) 
(citing incompetence as a reason to remove a manager). Courts have appointed 
trustees where doing so was “necessary to fill the vacuum of lawful manage-
ment,” In re Bayou Group, L.L.C., 363 B.R. 674, 681 (S.D.N.Y. 2007), when 
cost-benefit analysis revealed that appointing a trustee was “in the best inter-
ests of the creditors, equity security holders, and other interests of the estate,” 
In re National Staffing Servs., LLC, 338 B.R. 31, 34 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2005) 
(citing SunCruz Casinos, 298 B.R. at 829), when management exhibited “ei-
ther incompetent or fraudulent behavior” by making prepetition payments to 
itself, In re Nartron Corp., 330 B.R. 573, 593 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2005), and 
when “significant and numerous conflicts of interest impede[d the Estate’s] 
ability to fulfill its fiduciary duties to all of the bankruptcy estate’s creditors,” 
In re SunCruz Casinos, LLC, 298 B.R. at 832. 
 104. See, e.g., In re Fiesta Homes of Ga., Inc., 125 B.R. 321, 326 (Bankr. 
S.D. Ga. 1990); In re Cardinal Indus., Inc., 109 B.R. 755, 765–66 (Bankr. S.D. 
Ohio 1990); In re L.S. Good & Co., 8 B.R. 312, 315 (Bankr. N.D. W. Va. 1980). 
 105. See In re Adelphia Commc’ns Corp., 342 B.R. 122, 129 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) 
(“[A] debtor in possession’s duty to protect the property of its estate does not 
require overzealous pursuit of every claim, fraudulent conveyance, or avoid-
ance action.”), aff ’d, 342 B.R. 122 (S.D.N.Y 2006); In re G-I Holdings, Inc., 295 
B.R. at 511 (upholding the bankruptcy court’s decision not to appoint a trustee 
where creditors “failed to produce clear and convincing evidence of the need for 
a trustee under either subsection of 1104(a)”); In re 4 C Solutions, Inc., 289 
B.R. 354, 371 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 2003) (“As any entrepreneur knows, there is a 
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that at least some mismanagement and incompetence exists in 
every bankruptcy case.106 Indeed, in a case before the Code was 
amended to require trustee appointments in certain additional 
circumstances,107 one court indicated that it would not base a 
finding that cause existed to appoint a trustee solely because of 
management incompetence or even gross mismanagement.108 
Trustee appointments remain the exception despite the re-
cent changes to the Code.109 Indeed, courts have even resisted 
appointing trustees in large corporate reorganizations that are 
tainted with fraud and misconduct, though this may be because 
the managers who participated in the fraudulent conduct had 
already been replaced.110 Courts appear to resist appointing 
trustees for the same reasons Congress eliminated the Act’s re-
quirement that managers automatically be displaced upon the 
bankruptcy filing.111 That is, courts appear to fear that appoint-
ing a trustee would increase the estate’s expenses, would dis-
rupt the business by replacing existing, experienced manage-
ment (even though trustees can choose to retain managers if 
doing so is in the debtor’s best interests), or would discourage 
managers from filing timely bankruptcy petitions.112 
 
fine line between calculated risk taking and foolhardiness. What the [creditor] 
calls gross mismanagement, the DEBTOR calls calculated risk. The evidence 
favors the DEBTOR.”). 
 106. See In re Tricycle Enters., No. 04-65901, 2006 Bankr. LEXIS 4261, at 
*27–28 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2006) (citing Schuster v. Dragone, 266 B.R. 
268, 272 (D. Conn. 2001); In re Anchorage Boat Sales, Inc., 4 B.R. 635, 644–45 
(Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1980)); In re 4 C Solutions, Inc., 289 B.R. at 370; Mako, Inc., 
102 B.R. at 812. 
 107. See Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act 
§ 442(b) (providing additional grounds for appointment of a trustee). 
 108. In re Cardinal Indus., Inc., 109 B.R. at 765. 
 109. Entities for which courts recently did appoint trustees in Chapter 11 
proceedings include Clarent Corp., Country Seat Stores, Inc., e.spire Commu-
nications and Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. See THE 2004 BANKRUPTCY YEARBOOK & 
ALMANAC 325–31 (Christopher M. McHugh & Thomas A. Sawyer eds., 14th ed. 
2004). Generally, trustees were appointed to sue corporate officers or to pro-
tect the estate from those officers (and their lawyers and accountants) based 
on allegations that they failed to disclosure certain financial data or misap-
propriated corporate funds. Id. 
 110. See No Rush to Appoint Trustee for Enron, BANKR. CT. DECISIONS 
WKLY. NEWS & COMMENT, Feb. 26, 2002, at A1, available at Westlaw, 39 No. 1 
BCD (LRP) 1. But see Testimony: Court Competition for Large Ch. 11 Cases, 
AM. BANKR. INST. J., Sept. 2004, at 6, 54–55 (suggesting that courts may resist 
appointing trustees to replace corrupt managers for fear of alienating the 
people who will decide where to file an important case). 
 111. See H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 231 (1977), as reprinted in 1978 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6182. 
 112. Cf. In re 4 C Solutions, Inc., 289 B.R. at 370 (recognizing extra costs 
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In addition to the fear of losing their jobs, the debtor’s 
managers may resist having a trustee appointed because doing 
so would prevent the DIP from exercising its exclusive right to 
propose a plan of reorganization and to solicit support for that 
plan during the first 120 days of the bankruptcy case under the 
Code.113 Unsecured creditors or creditors’ committees may also 
resist seeking the appointment of a trustee if they fear that, 
without the exclusivity period, the debtor’s principal secured 
creditor will propose a plan that does not fairly consider their 
interests.114 
Secured creditors also appear resistant to trustee appoint-
ments—so much so that DIP financing agreements routinely 
provide that the appointment of a trustee (or an examiner) is 
 
incurred); Douglas G. Baird, The New Face of Chapter 11, 12 AMER. BANKR. L. 
REV. 69, 84 (2004) (asserting that creditors do not push for appointment of 
trustees in large cases); LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 54, at 757 n.281 (cit-
ing H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 231); see also Official Comm. of Unsecured Credi-
tors of Cybergenics Corp. ex rel. Cybergenics Corp. v. Chinery, 330 F.3d 548, 
577 (3d Cir. 2003) (recognizing both monetary burden and loss of expertise; 7 
COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 71, ¶ 1104.02[1] (summarizing why ap-
pointing a trustee is often to be avoided). 
 113. Cf. 11 U.S.C. § 1121(b), (c)(1) (2000 & Supp. 2006) (providing that “on-
ly the debtor may file a plan until after 120 days,” unless a trustee is ap-
pointed under (c)). 
 114. See Kenneth N. Klee & K. John Shaffer, Creditors’ Committees Under 
Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, 44 S.C. L. REV. 995, 1049–50 (1993) (dis-
cussing committee reluctance to terminate a debtor’s exclusivity period prema-
turely). Of course, not all creditors avoid seeking the appointment of a public 
trustee. For example, employees of United Airlines sought the appointment of 
a trustee because they had no faith in existing management, believed that the 
managers were determined to run the “proud airline into the ground, taking 
its workers and customers along with it,” and believed that the company’s “be-
trayal” of its employees was the “single largest obstacle to its recovery and 
emergence from Chapter 11.” Press Release, Ass’n of Flight Attendants-CWA, 
AFL-CIO, Grave Concern for United Airlines Prompts Flight Attendants to 
Call for New Management (Aug. 31, 2004), available at http://www.unitedafa 
.org/res/pr/details.asp?ReleaseID=119; see also Adrian Schofield, IAM Asks 
Bankruptcy Court to Appoint Trustee for United, AVIATION DAILY (Wash., 
D.C.), Aug. 12, 2004, at 1 (providing that the International Association of Ma-
chinists (IAM) “petitioned [the] bankruptcy court to appoint a trustee” because 
it felt “management ha[d] placed the carrier ‘on a collision course for disaster,’ 
and ‘the immediate appointment of a trustee [wa]s essential to the recovery’ of 
the airline” (quoting IAM officials)). Other examples are available. See, e.g., 
Drew DeSilver, Metropolitan Mortgage Files for Bankruptcy, SEATTLE TIMES, 
Feb. 5, 2004, at E1 (reporting that investors asked for the appointment of a 
trustee, claiming that “[a]ny plan that involves current management staying 
in control of the company is unacceptable”); Gary T. Pakulski, OC Alters Plan 
for Incentives to Retain Key Execs, THE BLADE (Toledo, Ohio), Mar. 2, 2004, at 
B7 (reporting that creditors asked the court to appoint a trustee to run Owens 
Corning because of management’s bias in favor of asbestos claimants). 
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an event of default.115 It is quite possible that creditors recoil at 
the thought of having a public trustee appointed because the 
trustee would be required to investigate all the debtor’s pre-
bankruptcy activities—including preferences and other activi-
ties involving the specific creditor. Secured creditors may also 
have an incentive to avoid having the court replace existing 
managers with a public trustee because of the control they 
would lose over the case, since the public trustee would have 
fiduciary duties to all parties in interest. 
D. Appointing an Examiner 
If the court has not ordered the appointment of a trustee, 
the Code permits it to appoint an examiner as long as the ap-
pointment is in the best interests of creditors, equity, and oth-
ers with an interest in the debtor’s estate,116 or if the firm’s un-
secured, nontrade, noninsider debts exceed five million 
dollars.117 If these conditions are met, courts are required to 
appoint examiners if there are allegations of manager “fraud, 
dishonesty, incompetence, misconduct, mismanagement, or 
[management irregularity].”118 Since the Code gives a court the 
authority to appoint an examiner if it has not ordered the ap-
pointment of a trustee, courts do not appear to have the author-
ity to appoint both an examiner and a trustee in the same 
case.119 
While the distinction between the duties of a trustee and 
those of an examiner are not clear-cut and often overlap,120 ex-
aminers typically are hired to focus on discrete matters and 
 
 115. See, e.g., Movie Gallery, Inc., Secured Super-Priority Debtor-in-
Possession Credit and Guaranty Agreement (Form 8-K, Ex. 10.1), at 97 (Oct. 
16, 2007); Silicon Graphics Inc., Post-Petition Loan and Security Agreement 
(Form 8-K, Ex. 10.1), at 38 (May 8, 2006); Trump Casino Funding, Inc. et al., 
Loan and Security Agreement (Form 8-K, Ex. 99.1), at 54 (Nov. 22, 2004). 
 116. 11 U.S.C. § 1104(c) (2000 & Supp. 2006). 
 117. Though the Code appears to mandate the appointment in large cases, 
a few courts have concluded that they are not required to appoint an examiner 
even if the debt levels are met. See In re Rutenberg, 158 B.R. 230, 232 (Bankr. 
M.D. Fla. 1993); In re GHR Cos., 43 B.R. 165, 169–70 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1984). 
 118. 11 U.S.C. § 1104(c). 
 119. Cf. id. § 1104(b), (c) (suggesting only that courts may choose one or the 
other). 
 120. For example, one court considered the possibility that a court could 
appoint either a trustee or an examiner to prosecute a fraudulent conveyance 
action if the DIP refuses to prosecute the matter but ultimately concluded that 
only appointment of a trustee would be allowed. See Official Comm. of Asbes-
tos Pers. Injury Claimants v. Sealed Air Corp. (In re W.R. Grace & Co.), 285 
B.R. 148, 156–57 (Bankr. D. Del. 2002). 
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generally do not operate the business.121 Most courts conclude 
that the primary role of the examiner is to investigate; the ex-
aminer should not displace the DIP, serve as the estate’s repre-
sentative, or take adversarial positions in the bankruptcy 
case.122 Courts will occasionally expand the examiner’s duties 
beyond simple investigations if the debtor refuses to promptly 
liquidate assets or to engage in meaningful negotiations during 
the plan confirmation process.123 
Whether or not examiners must be appointed in large 
business Chapter 11 reorganizations, they routinely are ap-
pointed in these cases, especially if there are allegations that 
the managers have engaged in deceptive or fraudulent conduct 
(especially if the fraud involves complex financial transactions) 
or if managers have refused to prosecute a fraudulent con-
veyance action against insiders.124 In addition, judges or elected 
officials may support the appointment of an examiner if they 
 
 121. For example, the court in the United Airlines bankruptcy case ap-
pointed an examiner to investigate the specific issue of whether the debtor 
fraudulently misled flight attendants into taking early retirement. Cf. Court 
Says Flight Attendants Weren’t Deceived into Retiring, WALL. ST. J., Mar. 19, 
2004, at A11 (describing findings of examiner on that discrete issue). 
 122. See United States ex rel. Rural Util. Serv. v. Schilling (In re Big Rivers 
Elec. Corp.), 355 F.3d 415, 429–30 (6th Cir. 2004); Airline Pilots Ass’n Int’l v. 
American Nat’l Bank & Trust Co. (In re Ionosphere Clubs, Inc.), 156 B.R. 414, 
432 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); In re FiberMark, Inc., 339 B.R. 321, 324 (Bankr. D. Vt. 
2006); In re Recoton Corp., 307 B.R. 751, 755 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2004); In re 
W.R. Grace & Co., 285 B.R. at 156; In re Gilman Servs., Inc., 46 B.R. 322, 327 
(Bankr. D. Mass. 1985); In re Baldwin United Corp., 46 B.R. 314, 316–17 
(Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1985). 
 123. See Weld ex rel. Patton’s Busy Bee Disposal Serv., Inc. v. Sweeney 
Agency, Inc. (In re Patton’s Busy Bee Disposal Serv., Inc.), 182 B.R. 681, 685–
87 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1995); In re Pub. Serv. Co., 99 B.R. 177, 182–83 (Bankr. 
D.N.H. 1989); In re John Peterson Motors, Inc., 47 B.R. 551, 553 (Bankr. D. 
Minn. 1985); In re Carnegie Int’l Corp., 51 B.R. 252, 256–57 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 
1984); cf. In re Great Barrington Fair & Amusement, Inc., 53 B.R. 241, 244 
(Bankr. D. Mass. 1985) (accepting a plan proposed by the examiner). 
 124. See, e.g., In re W.R. Grace Co., 285 B.R. at 155–56; see also Carrie 
Johnson, Enron Bankruptcy Examiner’s Fees Soar, WASH. POST, Dec. 30, 2003, 
at E1 (discussing role of examiner in Enron and other prominent bankruptcy 
cases). For example, in 2002 and 2003, examiners were appointed in Enron, 
WorldCom, Polaroid, NewPower Holdings, Inc., Polymer Group, and other 
bankruptcy cases. See THE 2004 BANKRUPTCY YEARBOOK & ALMANAC, supra 
note 109, at 325–35. In 2005, examiners were appointed in American Business 
Financial Services, Asia Global Crossing, ATA Holdings, FiberMark, Loral 
Space, Winn-Dixie, and other bankruptcies. THE 2006 BANKRUPTCY YEAR-
BOOK & ALMANAC 304–14 (Kerry A. Mastroianni ed. 2006). In 2006, examiners 
were appointed in Desert Health, Desert Health, Current Report (Form 8-K), 
at 2 (Oct. 4, 2006), and Refco, Final Report of Examiner at 5, In re Refco Inc., 
No. 05-60006 (S.D.N.Y. July 11, 2007). 
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perceive that one is needed to send a message or otherwise im-
prove the public’s confidence in the bankruptcy process.125 
Though the appointment may be needed, having an ex-
aminer in a case can substantially increase the costs of the re-
organization and, accordingly, reduce the amount available to 
pay creditor claims. Because examiners are often appointed in 
cases that have active creditor committees, courts have refused 
to appoint an examiner if doing so would increase the number 
of fiduciaries already involved in a case. Some courts have ar-
gued that examiners often duplicate the work already being 
performed by creditors’ committees.126 The controversy asso-
ciated with the examiner appointed in the Enron case best illu-
strates these problems. 
The examiner, a lawyer at a major law firm, was appointed 
to search for assets (including potential claims against former 
advisors and lending institutions) that could be used to pay 
Enron’s creditors.127 While the examiner may have uncovered 
information that helped Enron’s creditors recover funds from 
banks and other financial entities, conducting the investigation 
involved the examiner and 150 lawyers from his law firm.128 
The examiner at one point billed Enron up to $3 million 
monthly.129 Several creditors and law firms involved in the case 
(including, not surprisingly, some who may have been under 
investigation) objected to the examiner’s fees and actions, con-
tending that the examiner was acting like a “special prosecu-
 
 125. See Shawn Young et al., WorldCom Gets Judge’s Approval for $750 
Million in Financing, WALL ST. J., July 23, 2002, at A3 (reporting the U.S. At-
torney General’s support for an examiner because appointment would create a 
transparent process that enhances accountability). 
 126. See, e.g., David Elman, Adelphia to Probe Boies Fees, DAILY DEAL, 
Feb. 9, 2006, 2006 WLNR 2242041 (stating that the court refused to appoint 
an examiner and add “another $350,000 to accomplish ends” that the court 
concluded could be addressed in a “more efficient and economical manner”). 
 127. See, e.g., David Barboza, Lawyer Proves a Thorn for Enron’s Partners, 
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 2002, at C1; Johnson, supra note 124. The examiner was 
hired to investigate accounting irregularities, mismanagement, and fraud. Id.; 
see also Amy Vincent, Splitting the WorldCom Spoils, AM. LAW., Apr. 2004, at 
91, 159. 
 128. Barboza, supra note 127. The examiner’s law firm, Alston & Bird had 
at that time approximately 675 lawyers. At one point, more than twenty per-
cent of the firm had billed time to the Enron case. See John R. Emshwiller & 
Mitchell Pacelle, Enron Examiner Faces Criticism Over Fees in Case, WALL ST. 
J. EUR., May 7, 2003, at UKA5. Moreover, the fee was reported to be one-third 
of the law firm’s annual income in 2002. Antony Collins, Batson to Earn $95m 
for 18 Months Enron Work, LEGAL WK. GLOBAL, Mar. 25, 2004. 
 129. Barboza, supra note 127. 
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tor” and that the examiner’s work duplicated the work of the 
creditors’ committee.130 Whether or not the work benefited the 
Enron creditors, the Enron examiner ultimately received ap-
proximately $90 million for his work in the case.131 
III. CONTRACTUALLY SEIZING CONTROL OF 
CORPORATE REORGANIZATIONS  
If managers are generally not responsible for causing a 
firm’s insolvency, then experienced and competent managers 
should be allowed to continue to run the company and should 
not be replaced by a statutory public trustee who has no specia-
lized knowledge of the business. When Congress reversed the 
presumption that managers would be displaced by an indepen-
dent trustee, the Code radically increased the leverage manag-
ers had under the Act’s trustee-controlled regime. Notwith-
standing the potential benefits of manager-controlled 
reorganizations, creditors (and employees) in large Chapter 11 
filings have sought to strip managers of control of insolvent 
firms because of their belief that the existing managers 
created, or at least contributed to, the financial distress that 
 
 130. Id. Creditors in the United Airlines case also objected to the $15 mil-
lion fee requested by a restructuring firm, contending that such a guaranteed 
fee was not related to benefits that the firm conferred on either the debtor or 
the bankruptcy estate. See Marilyn Adams, United Pays Outside Advisers Mil-
lions, USA TODAY, Jan. 8, 2003, at B1. Similarly, creditors raised objections to 
the $1 million monthly fee requested by a management consulting firm be-
cause of their concern that the management firm’s work duplicated the work 
performed by the debtor’s managers or other advisers. See id. 
 131. Collins, supra note 128; Mitchell Pacelle, Enron Bankruptcy Specialist 
to File for Additional Payment, WALL ST. J., Sept. 3, 2004, at A2. Total court-
awarded professional fees in the Enron case amounted to $780 million, but if 
postpetition fees are included, the amount exceeded $1 billion. See Edward 
Iwata, Enron’s Legacy: Scandal Marked Turning Point for Business World, 
USA TODAY Jan. 30, 2006 at B4. By way of contrast, Enron’s reorganization 
plan provided about $11.5 billion to creditors. Kristen Hays, Enron Takes a 
New Name, HOUSTON CHRON. Apr. 3, 2007 at 1. Fees charged by the examiner 
in WorldCom, while not nearly as large as the Enron examiner fees, exceeded 
$18 million. Final Fee Application of Kirkpatrick & Lockhart LLP for Court 
Approval and Allowance for Compensation for Services Rendered and Ex-
penses Incurred as Counsel to the Bankruptcy Court Examiner During the Pe-
riod August 6, 2002 Through April 20, 2004 at 2–8, In re WorldCom, Inc., No. 
02-13533 (AJG) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Aug. 2, 2004). Total fees and expenses billed 
in the WorldCom case amounted to about $1 billion. James Doran, MCI Faces 
$1 Billion Bill for Chapter 11, TIMES (London), Apr. 21, 2004 at 26. Though 
WorldCom was the largest bankruptcy filing in U.S. history at that time, fees 
in that case were significantly smaller than the fee requests eventually filed in 
Enron. See Tom Becker, MCI Advisers and Lawyers Demand US $613M in 
Pay, NAT’L POST (Ontario), Aug. 17, 2004, at FP8.  
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caused the business to file for bankruptcy. Likewise, despite 
the legislative conclusion that Chapter 11’s manager-controlled 
process would lead to a more efficient and successful reorgani-
zation,132 the presumption that business reorganizations should 
be controlled by existing managers has been bitterly criticized 
by academic commentators133 and by participants in the bank-
ruptcy process.134 
Most opponents of Chapter 11’s manager-controlled model 
argue that it is an inefficient way to repay creditors.135 Some 
suggest that the manager-controlled presumption is inconsis-
tent with Chapter 11’s sole purpose, which they contend is to 
protect creditors’ state law rights. Other commentators criticize 
the presumption because it allows managers to protect the in-
terests of shareholders (or their own self-interest in remaining 
employed) with little direct supervision, which prolongs the 
bankruptcy case and unduly delays creditors’ collection at-
tempts.136 Critics further argue that a manager-controlled sys-
tem fails to give managers an adequate incentive to prevent the 
firm from becoming insolvent and that a regime that presump-
tively ousted managers would be more efficient.137 
Several academic commentators have described ways cred-
itors appear to have contractually seized control of companies 
both before and after the firm files for bankruptcy. These scho-
lars observe that security interests in the debtor’s property ef-
 
 132. H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 231–33 (1977), as reprinted in 1978 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6182; see also Korobkin, supra note 58, at 674–75 (arguing 
that congressional assumptions regarding efficiency were unfounded). 
 133. See THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY 
LAW 7–19, 22–27 (1986); Barry E. Adler, A Theory of Corporate Insolvency, 72 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 343, 362–63 (1997) [hereinafter Adler, Corporate Insolvency]; 
Barry E. Adler, Financial and Political Theories of American Corporate Bank-
ruptcy, 45 STAN. L. REV. 311, 319–23 (1993); Douglas G. Baird, Loss Distribu-
tion, Forum Shopping, and Bankruptcy: A Reply to Warren, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 
815, 822–24 (1987); Randal C. Picker, Security Interests, Misbehavior, and 
Common Pools, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 645, 678–79 (1992). 
 134. See, e.g., Jerald I. Ancel et al., On the Edge: Appointing and Electing 
the Chapter 11 Trustee After the 1994 Amendments, AM. BANKR. INST. J., July–
Aug. 1995, at 20–21. 
 135. See, e.g., Adler, Corporate Insolvency, supra note 133, at 362–63. 
 136. See, e.g., Michael Bradley & Michael Rosenzweig, The Untenable Case 
for Chapter 11, 101 YALE L.J. 1043, 1045–46 (1992); Christopher W. Frost, The 
Theory, Reality and Pragmatism of Corporate Governance in Bankruptcy Re-
organizations, 72 AM. BANKR. L.J. 103, 113 n.41 (1998). 
 137. John Armour et al., Corporate Ownership Structure and the Evolution 
of Bankruptcy Law: Lessons from the United Kingdom, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1699, 
1728–30 (2002); James J. White, Harvey’s Silence, 69 AM. BANKR. L.J. 467, 471 
(1995). 
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fectively give secured creditors the right to control the firm’s 
management structure and how it will be restructured in bank-
ruptcy.138 Indeed, this increase in creditor control has caused 
some academic commentators to suggest that Chapter 11 no 
longer employs the debtor-in-possession model but instead uses 
the secured-party-in-possession model.139 As the next sections 
show, creditors now use contractual devices to control the deb-
tor’s cash; to decide whether the firm will be sold piecemeal, in-
tact, or will continue to operate in its existing corporate form; 
and, perhaps most importantly, to determine who will control 
the firm in bankruptcy. 
A. CONTROLLING CASH 
The increased use of security arrangements (like revolving 
or secured credit facilities) shifts control of financially dis-
tressed firms from managers to creditors by giving creditors 
control over a firm’s most valuable asset: cash.140 By placing re-
straints on a company’s ability to use existing cash or to obtain 
new cash in the reorganization proceeding, lenders have re-
gained much of the leverage they had under the Act. Managers’ 
ability to control the reorganization process has been restricted 
by the control creditors now exert over the debtor’s prepetition 
cash, postpetition cash collateral,141 and access to (and use of) 
new capital. 
In general, a secured credit facility gives the lead lender 
control of the debtor’s cash collateral, limits the debtor’s access 
 
 138. See SKEEL, supra note 47, at 85–86; Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. 
Rasmussen, Chapter 11 at Twilight, 56 STAN. L. REV. 673, 693–99 (2003) [he-
reinafter Baird & Rasmussen, Chapter 11 at Twilight]; Douglas G. Baird & 
Robert K. Rasmussen, The End of Bankruptcy, 55 STAN. L. REV. 751, 777–89 
(2002) [hereinafter Baird & Rasmussen, The End of Bankruptcy]; Stephen J. 
Lubben, The “New and Improved” Chapter 11, 93 KY. L.J. 839, 848–56 (2004); 
Jay Lawrence Westbrook, The Control of Wealth in Bankruptcy, 82 TEX. L. 
REV. 795, 827–54 (2004). 
 139. See, e.g., Elizabeth Warren & Jay L. Westbrook, Secured Party in Pos-
session, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Sept. 2003, at 12, 12 (suggesting that the SPIP 
model converts Chapter 11 into a process that serves only to permit secured 
parties to use bankruptcy laws to enforce their state law Article 9 rights). 
 140. See Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Private Debt and the 
Missing Lever of Corporate Governance, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1209, 1229 (2006) 
[hereinafter Baird & Rasmussen, Missing Lever] (explaining that the ability to 
cut off a company’s cash flow is a greater threat than the ability to repossess 
collateral because cash is worth as much in the lender’s hands as the debtor’s). 
 141. Cash collateral is defined as cash, negotiable instruments, or other 
cash equivalents and includes the proceeds, products, or profits of property. 
See 11 U.S.C. § 363(a) (2000 & Supp. 2006). 
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to cash to a prescribed formula, and lets the lender terminate 
the arrangement and shut down the firm if there is a default 
(which the lender can declare if it has reasonable grounds to be 
concerned about its security).142 In addition, debtor firms are 
prevented from using cash collateral that is encumbered by 
another party’s interest unless that party consents or the court 
orders the party to permit the debtor to use the cash.143 Since 
the debtor’s primary prepetition lender often has a lien on all 
the debtor’s assets, the DIP must get permission to use the 
cash or cash collateral. 
Most large firms that enter Chapter 11 need postpetition 
capital because they rarely have a sufficient amount of unen-
cumbered cash to continue to operate the business.144 Though it 
may seem counterintuitive to lend to a company in bankruptcy, 
financial institutions actively participate in DIP lending, which 
can be both profitable and beneficial to a lender’s security posi-
tion. Not only can DIP lenders charge higher fees and interest 
rates, but these loans typically are secured by a first position 
security interest, and DIP liens are given superpriority admin-
istrative claim status (i.e., are paid first) in the bankruptcy 
case.145 In addition, existing lenders often agree to provide DIP 
 
 142. See Baird & Rasmussen, Missing Lever, supra note 140, at 1227–28. 
 143. 11 U.S.C. § 363(c)(2)(A)–(B); see David A. Skeel, Jr., Creditors’ Ball: 
The “New” New Corporate Governance in Chapter 11, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 917, 
935–38 (2003) (discussing DIP lenders’ control in Chapter 11 cases). 
 144. Courts resist giving DIP lenders a lien on the debtor’s prepetition as-
sets if doing so would result in a subordination (or “priming”) of the lien of an 
existing creditor. Indeed, since debtors typically lack sufficient unencumbered 
assets to secure adequate postpetition financing, preexisting lenders often 
provide DIP financing. See, e.g., Barry E. Adler, Bankruptcy Primitives, 12 AM. 
BANKR. INST. L. REV. 219, 225 (2004); Jason B. Burnett & Kenneth B. Jacobs, 
Cross-Collateralization in the Wake of Shapiro v. Saybrook Manufacturing Co. 
(In re Saybrook Manufacturing Co.), 9 BANKR. DEV. J. 503, 505 (1993); Bruce 
A. Henoch, Postpetition Financing: Is There Life After Debt?, 8 BANKR. DEV. J. 
575, 598 (1991). 
 145. See Sris Chatterjee et al., Debtor-in-Possession Financing, 28 J. OF 
BANKING & FIN. 3097, 3108–09 (2006) (discussing the higher fees and rates 
charged by DIP lenders); Jonathan Friedland, The Impact of New Entrants on 
Chapter 11: Bankruptcy Processes Continue to Evolve, J. CORP. RENEWAL, Dec. 
2007, at 22, available at http://www.turnaround.org/Publications/Articles 
.aspx?objectID=8505; Marshall S. Huebner, Debtor-in-Possession Financing, 
RMA J., Apr. 2005, at 70 (discussing the superpriority status enjoyed by DIP 
lenders). Administrative expense claims have a higher priority in payment 
than virtually all other claims. 11 U.S.C. § 507(a) (2000 & Supp. 2006); see al-
so id. § 503(b) (detailing administrative expenses eligible for payment); Baird 
& Rasmussen, Missing Lever, supra note 140, at 1238–42 (discussing exam-
ples of DIP lending agreements involving large Chapter 11 reorganizations). 
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financing only if the debtor protects their prepetition debt by 
repaying that debt before other debts (commonly known as a 
“rollup”).146 DIP lenders also demand that they be released 
from all liability based on claims the debtor or creditors may 
assert against them based on their involvement in the debtor’s 
bankruptcy proceeding, and they demand that debtors release 
potential defenses against the lender and waive actions against 
the DIP lender if those actions would harm the lender.147 Like-
wise, some DIP financing orders give the lender the right to se-
ize its collateral notwithstanding the restrictions imposed by 
the Code’s automatic stay of collection activities.148 
Because debtors know they will need to use cash collateral 
and most likely will need postfiling financing, lenders who pro-
vide the funds firms need for their long-term survival can exert 
extraordinary power over the reorganization. As a matter of 
course, debtors negotiate with the secured creditor who has an 
interest in the cash collateral or who will provide DIP financing 
well before the bankruptcy filing. Debtors start these discus-
sions before the bankruptcy petition is filed to ensure that one 
of the “first-day” orders gives them permission to use or borrow 
money.149 First-day orders are entered in virtually all large re-
 
 146. A rollup essentially forces the debtor to pay the lender’s prepetition 
and postpetition claims in cash and in full at the end of the bankruptcy case. 
Gen. Elec. Capital Corp., v. Nigro (In re Appliance Store, Inc.), 181 B.R. 237, 
243 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1995) (describing rollup provisions in proposed cash col-
lateral order). See generally In re Colad Group, Inc., 324 B.R. 208, 217–19 
(Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2005) (discussing problems posed by cross-collateralization 
and rollup provisions in a first-day order). But cf. Craig R. Bucki, Cracking the 
Code: The Legal Authority Behind Extrastatutory Debtor-in-Possession Financ-
ing Mechanisms and Their Prospects for Survival, 2005 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 
357, 360–75 (arguing in favor of the efficiency and autonomy benefits of rol-
lups). 
 147. In re Airadigm Commc’ns, Inc., 519 F.3d 640, 655–56 (7th Cir. 2008); 
In re Insilco Techs., Inc., 480 F.3d 212, 220 (3d Cir. 2007) (finding that lan-
guage in a settlement agreement releasing debtor's claims against certain 
lenders barred the Trustee's action to recharacterize or equitably subordinate 
those claims); In re MS55, Inc., No. 06-cv-012333-EWN, 2007 WL 2669150, at 
*3 (D. Colo. Sept. 6, 2007) (discussing the debtor's release of claims against its 
DIP lenders upon conversion to Chapter 7). 
 148. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 115; see also Marrs-Winn Co. v. Gi-
berson Elec., Inc. (In re Marrs-Winn Co.), 103 F.3d 584, 594–95 (7th Cir. 1996) 
(involving an example of such a financing order); In re Stoney Creek Techs., 
LLC, 364 B.R. 882, 895–96 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2007) (denying relief requested 
pursuant to financing order); In re Colad Group, 324 B.R. at 218–19 (characte-
rizing financing order as “inappropriately complex”). 
 149. See 11 U.S.C. § 364(c)–(d) (2000) (giving DIP the authority to obtain 
secured credit); see also James J. White, Death and Resurrection of Secured 
Credit, 12 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 139, 177–78 (2004) (discussing common 
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organizations on an expedited basis150 in order to address time-
sensitive matters such as obtaining DIP financing, using cash 
collateral, paying certain creditor claims,151 and retaining key 
executives.152 While there are benefits to resolving time-
sensitive matters early in the case, lenders often demand that 
debtors cede control of their assets or of the reorganization 
process in these early complex orders before other parties in in-
terest in the Chapter 11 case (notably, unsecured creditors and 
employees) have had a chance to organize.153 Because of this, 
 
practice of prefiling negotiations). But cf. David Barboza, The Meter Runs in 
Enron Case, as the Lawyers Retain Lawyers, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 25, 2002, at C1 
(noting that Enron obtained postpetition DIP financing but ultimately never 
needed to use it because of strong cash flows). 
 150. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Cybergenics Corp. v. Chi-
nery, 330 F.3d 548, 574 n.8 (3d Cir. 2003); see Marcus Cole, “Delaware is Not a 
State”: Are We Witnessing Jurisdictional Competition in Bankruptcy?, 55 
VAND. L. REV. 1845 app. at 1912 (2002). 
 151. Debtors often seek to pay the prepetition claims of certain creditors by 
contending that those creditors are “critical vendors” who will refuse to do 
business with the debtor unless their claims are paid in full. See, e.g., Cyber-
genics Corp., 330 F.3d at 574 n.8. See generally In re NVR L.P., 147 B.R. 126, 
127 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1992) (addressing a prepetition claim for incentive com-
pensation by a former employee); Joseph Gilday, “Critical” Error: Why Essen-
tial Vendor Payments Violate the Bankruptcy Code, 11 AM. BANKR. INST. L. 
REV. 411, 415–30 (2003) (addressing issues surrounding critical-vendor mo-
tions). Until the Seventh Circuit questioned whether bankruptcy courts can 
rely on the equitable “doctrine of necessity” to pay these claims, courts rou-
tinely granted critical-vendor motions. See In re Kmart Corp., 359 F.3d 866, 
871–74 (7th Cir. 2004) (characterizing the doctrine of necessity as “just a fancy 
name for a power to depart from the Code” and requiring debtors to prove that 
vendors would cease dealing with the debtor if their claims were not paid in 
full and that paying the vendors would provide residual benefits to creditors 
whose claims were not being paid).  
 152. Courts are frequently asked to approve retention (also called “pay-to-
stay”) bonuses to key employees to encourage them to remain with the compa-
ny after the business files for bankruptcy. See Rebecca Revich, The KERP 
Revolution, 81 AM. BANKR. L.J. 87 (2007). Recent amendments to the Code 
now restrict a firm’s ability to pay employees (often the managers) large sums 
to remain with the firm while it reorganizes in Chapter 11 by requiring firms 
to prove that key employees are essential to the survival of the business and 
that the bonus is paid to give the employee an incentive to achieve certain per-
formance goals. 11 U.S.C. § 503(c)(1) (2000 & Supp. 2006); see Revich, supra 
(discussing Key Employee Retention Plans under new law).  
 153. In re Colad Group, Inc., 324 B.R. 208, 213–14 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2005). 
See Cole, supra note 150, app. at 1912 (statement by Delaware bankruptcy 
judge that creditors receive “little or no notice” of the hearing to decide first-
day orders). Critical-vendor motions often are criticized because they place few 
restrictions on the managers’ ability to protect creditors, appear to favor cer-
tain vendors who have preexisting relationships with the debtor’s managers, 
and because paying these vendor claims may dramatically reduce the debtor’s 
available cash. See Gilday, supra note 151, at 419–23. 
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some courts refuse to approve certain lender-favorable provi-
sions in first-day orders unless the provisions are narrowly tai-
lored to preserve the debtor’s business while the Chapter 11 
proceeding progresses and are not designed to determine the 
firm’s fate during the first few days of the case.154 Other courts 
enter DIP financing or cash collateral orders that give creditors’ 
committees a limited right to carefully scrutinize the orders 
and determine whether to investigate and pursue claims 
against the lender.155 
B. CONTROLLING FIRM DISPOSITION 
Lenders also appear to be exerting control over the scope of 
the Chapter 11 plan of reorganization and the ultimate disposi-
tion of the firm and its assets.156 Many large firms that have 
filed for relief under Chapter 11 in the last few years have been 
sold or transferred to a new owner as part of a prenegotiated 
arrangement between the debtor and the debtor’s DIP-lender, 
exit-financier, or new owner.157 That more firms are selling all 
their assets in going-concern sales without even confirming a 
reorganization plan is not necessarily cause for alarm and is 
not inconsistent with the Code. The Code, unlike the Act, al-
lows debtors to use Chapter 11 to determine whether the firm 
could (or should) be reorganized, or whether all or part of the 
firm’s assets should be sold efficiently and in an orderly fa-
shion.158 However, certain powerful creditor groups appear to 
 
 154. See, e.g., In re Colad Group, 324 B.R. at 213. 
 155. Cole, supra note 150, app. at 1913; see also U.S. BANKR. CT., N.D. 
CAL., GUIDELINES FOR CASH COLLATERAL & FINANCING MOTIONS & STIPULA-
TIONS § E (2006) (refusing to approve cross-collateralization clauses or waivers 
of avoidance action); U.S. BANKR. CT., S.D.N.Y. GUIDELINES FOR FINANCING 
REQUESTS § II (2002); U.S. BANKR. CT., W.D. PA., GUIDELINES FOR CASH COL-
LATERAL ORDERS (2003). 
 156. See, e.g., In re Stoney Creek Techs., LLC, 364 B.R. 882, 891–92, 895 
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2007) (rejecting debtor’s attempts to obtain additional financ-
ing under Chapter 11 reorganization provisions because of inadequate protec-
tions for creditors); see also Baird & Rasmussen, Missing Lever, supra note 
140, at 1239–40 (discussing terms found in DIP agreements). 
 157. Firms that used Chapter 11 essentially to implement a prearranged 
sale, merger, or acquisition include Aurora, Bethlehem Steel, Budget, Conseco, 
Comdisco, Exodus, Fleming, Global Crossing, Integrated Health Care, Iri-
dium, LTV, Rand McNally, XO Communications, Macy’s, McLeodUSA, 
Stroud’s PSINet, TWA, and Unicapital. See Baird, supra note 112, at 69–83; 
Dickerson, supra note 38, at 115 nn.39–40. 
 158. See 11 U.S.C. § 1123(a)(5)(D) (2000 & Supp. 2006) (authorizing the 
sale of all or part of debtor’s assets in Chapter 11 proceeding); H.R. REP. NO. 
95-595, at 407 (1977), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6182 (stating 
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demand quick asset sales even if those sales are not in the best 
interest of other parties involved in the case.159 
Until relatively recently, most creditors in Chapter 11 re-
organizations were either trade creditors or traditional lending 
institutions.160 Trade creditors had an interest in helping the 
firm restructure and remain in business as a partner.161 Lend-
ers largely consisted of a limited number of relatively sophisti-
cated banks that had longstanding relationships they wanted 
to maintain with business debtors.162 This gave them an incen-
tive to help the firm emerge from Chapter 11 as a successful 
ongoing business.163 However, the changing nature of debt 
structures in modern reorganizations has caused creditors who 
have controlling financial interests in large business debtors to 
have no desire to have or maintain a close or long-term rela-
tionship with the debtor/borrower.164 
Over the last decade, traditional banking institutions have 
joined with nontraditional lending entities to spread their in-
vestment risks while providing credit to individual debtors as 
part of a loan syndicate.165 Lenders that are part of a syndi-
 
that a Chapter 11 plan, here a liquidation plan, may “propose the sale of all or 
substantially all of the property of the estate, and the distribution of the 
proceeds of the sale among creditors and equity security holders”); see also 
Danny Thomas Props. II Ltd. P’ship v. Beal Bank, S.S.B. (In re Danny Thomas 
Props. II Ltd. P’ship), 241 F.3d 959, 963 (8th Cir. 2001) (stating that a sale of 
assets is a proper part of a reorganization plan); Fruehauf Corp. v. Jartran, 
Inc. (In re Jartran, Inc.), 886 F.2d 859, 866–67 (7th Cir. 1989) (acknowledging 
liquidation in Chapter 11); Sandy Ridge Dev. Corp. v. La. Nat’l Bank (In re 
Sandy Ridge Dev. Corp.), 881 F.2d 1346, 1352 (5th Cir. 1989) (“[A]lthough 
Chapter 11 is titled ‘Reorganization,’ a plan may result in the liquidation of 
the debtor.”). 
 159. Lynn M. LoPucki & Joseph W. Doherty, Bankruptcy Fire Sales, 106 
MICH. L. REV. 1, 4, 24–25 (2007) (arguing that recoveries in reorganizations 
are higher than recoveries in quick fire sales). 
 160. Cf. Harvey R. Miller & Shai Y. Waisman, Does Chapter 11 Reorgani-
zation Remain a Viable Option for Distressed Businesses for the Twenty-First 
Century, 78 AM. BANKR. L.J. 153, 181 (2004) (describing the typical relation-
ship that existed between debtors and creditors in the 1970s and 1980s, and 
contrasting it with today’s practices). 
 161. See id. (explaining that trade creditors, as fellow members of an inter-
connected and local business community, had an interest in the long-term suc-
cess of bankrupt enterprises). 
 162. Cf. id. (“[L]ong-standing relationships were also shared among debtors 
were also shared among debtors and financial institutions.”). 
 163. See Harvey R. Miller, Chapter 11 Reorganization Cases and the Dela-
ware Myth, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1987, 2014 (2002); Miller & Waisman, supra note 
160, at 181–82. 
 164. See Miller & Waisman, supra note 160, at 181–82. 
 165. See Miller, supra note 163, at 2014–15; Miller & Waisman, supra note 
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cated loan are often anonymous, do not meet the firm’s manag-
ers until the firm is in financial distress or default, and have no 
interest in having an ongoing relationship with the business 
debtor.166 Moreover, because many of these creditors cannot le-
gally hold stock, they cannot agree to swap debt for equity in 
the reorganized business—something that had widely been 
used to restructure large firms’ debts in Chapter 11.167 Thus, 
their sole goal is to sell their claims and make a profit.168 This 
short-term interest in the debtor gives them an incentive either 
to encourage managers to quickly sell the debtor or to force the 
debtor to hire managers who will advance the creditors’ 
goals.169 
Finally, firms are increasingly being pushed into quick 
sales because of the active market in the sale of claims in bank-
ruptcy, the presence of second-lien credit facilities, and the in-
creased influence of hedge funds.170 While these changes pro-
vide additional and often needed liquidity in the market, hedge 
funds and other entities that purchase claims in bankruptcy 
(often referred to as distressed debt traders or “vulture” inves-
tors) generally have no interest in maintaining an ongoing 
business relationship with the debtor since their goal is often to 
 
160, at 198. Many of the creditors of large businesses are collateralized debt 
obligations; see also Baird & Rasmussen, Missing Lever, supra note 140, at 
1244 (discussing the structure of syndicated loans); Christopher O’Leary, 
CDOs Change Nature of Market, HIGH YIELD REP., Mar. 13, 2000, at 6–7 (dis-
cussing the growth of CDOs as investors in a variety of sectors). 
 166. See Steven A. Dennis & Donald J. Mullineaux, Syndicated Loans, 9 J. 
FIN. INTERMEDIATION 404, 407–09 (2000) (detailing the loan syndication 
process and noting that “[t]he participants [as opposed to the agent bank] are 
not generally involved in negotiations with the borrower”); see also Miller, su-
pra note 163, at 2014 (“Distressed debt traders . . . may have no interest in the 
debtor’s long-term viability.”). 
 167. Participants in syndicated loans include “insurance companies, mu-
tual funds, and other institutional fund managers.” Dennis & Mullineaux, su-
pra note 166, at 407. For example, the Enron plan proposes to pay $12 billion 
of the $63 billion in creditor claims by selling assets and giving creditors stock 
in one of the three companies created from the restructuring (and disman-
tling) of the original Enron corporate structure. Rebecca Smith, Enron’s Reor-
ganization Plan Is Cleared by Bankruptcy Judge, WALL ST. J., Jul. 16, 2004, at 
A2. 
 168. See Miller & Waisman, supra note 160, at 181–82. 
 169. See id. 
 170. For a description and discussion of the new players in debt restructur-
ings, see Frederick F. Eisenbiegler & Robert A.J. Barry, New Players, Debt 
Structures Will Shape Next Restructuring Wave: Second Liens Worry Borrow-
ers, Lenders, Professionals, J. CORP. RENEWAL, Mar. 2007, at 10, available at 
http://www.turnaround.org/publications/articles.aspx?objectID=7275. 
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either quickly collect their debt or take ownership of the com-
pany.171 For this reason, they generally have no interest in and 
are unwilling to support efforts to help the debtor establish new 
or improved business operations.172 Because these creditors 
typically want to sell their claims and receive a short-term (but 
often substantial) return on their investment, they aggressively 
urge or force the debtor to quickly end the Chapter 11 proceed-
ing by selling the company’s assets, either to the creditors 
themselves or to another investor.173 To resolve any objections 
to a quick sale, these secured creditors have even been willing 
to agree to give the unsecured creditors’ committee a portion of 
the sale proceeds in what generally is referred to as a carve-out 
agreement.174 
C. FIRING MANAGERS 
While court-ordered management changes are rare, share-
holders and lenders now exercise tremendous control over an 
insolvent (or nearly insolvent) firm’s management structure. 
Indeed, despite Chapter 11’s presumption of manager control, 
anecdotal evidence and empirical data indicate that creditors 
are causing the officers of large firms to be ousted in anticipa-
tion of, or just after, the bankruptcy filing. Indeed, sharehold-
ers and lenders appear to routinely force the removal of poorly 
performing officers once the firm approaches insolvency.175 
 
 171. See id. at 10.  
 172. See Eric B. Fisher & Andrew L. Buck, Hedge Funds and the Changing 
Face of Corporate Bankruptcy Practice, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Dec.–Jan. 2007, 
at 24, 87 (discussing the impacts of hedge funds and vulture investors on the 
reorganization process); Chapter 22: Are Vulture Investors to Blame?, BANKR. 
CT. DECISIONS WKLY. NEWS & COMMENT, Aug. 21, 2001, at A1; Miller & 
Waisman, supra note 160, at 181. 
 173. See Harvey R. Miller & Shai Y. Waisman, Is Chapter 11 Bankrupt?, 47 
B.C. L. REV. 129, 156–57 (2005) (discussing how hedge funds and other alter-
native investors prefer asset sales, which ensure a quick return on their in-
vestment, to debtor rehabilitation). 
 174. See Richard M. Bendix, Jr. & David E. Beker, Carve-Out Agreements 
for the Benefit of Unsecured Creditors: Unanswered Questions, AM. BANKR. 
INST. J., Apr. 2007, at 24 (describing the process secured creditors use to en-
sure the business is sold as a going concern and that unsecured creditors do 
not object to the quick sale). 
 175. See Courses Help Sharpen Directors’ Skills, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 9, 1995, 
§ 7, at 8 (stating that shareholders have increased the pressure on directors to 
remove managers of poorly performing companies); Joe Gardyasz, Touch 1 
May Sell Telemarketer, BISMARCK TRIB., July 18, 1998, at B1 (noting that the 
founder and CEO of Touch 1 was replaced at the request of the company’s se-
cured creditors); Chris Kauffmann, Two Directors Leave Marine Bank Board, 
VERO BEACH PRESS J. (Fla.), June 24, 2003, at B8 (discussing shareholder re-
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Empirical studies have found that officers are replaced in 
roughly half of the firms who are in financial distress, that is, 
those that are in default on their debt, insolvent, privately re-
structuring their debt to avoid bankruptcy, or have filed for 
bankruptcy.176 Even if the top-level officers are not ousted be-
fore the filing, many do not survive large corporate reorganiza-
tions.177 For example, the CEOs of Global Crossing, Flag Tele-
com and Leap Wireless were all replaced after their cases were 
filed.178 A recent study of companies that emerged from bank-
ruptcy in the 1990s found that the companies eliminated thirty-
one percent of the workforce.179 Moreover, ninety percent of the 
time, CEOs, COOs, and other top-level managers who were 
employed by the firm when the Chapter 11 proceeding began 
either resigned or were fired by the time the firm emerged from 
the reorganization.180 Of those who are replaced after a firm 
enters bankruptcy, most are fired (or forced to retire) just after 
the bankruptcy petition is filed.181 
An increased desire to replace managers is, of course, con-
sistent with the pre-Code practice of automatically terminating 
 
moval of nine directors at a bank in poor financial condition); Jeff Manning, 
Judge Dismisses Claim Ex-Wilshire Executives Improperly Got Funds, ORE-
GONIAN, July 25, 2000, at A1 (explaining that after gaining majority on board 
of directors, creditors fired founder and CEO of Wilshire); David Warsh, Swe-
dish Import May Be Just What Business Needs, CHI. TRIB., July 4, 1993, § 7, at 
4 (stating that high-level executives of IBM, Digital Equipment, General Mo-
tors, Salomon Brothers, and American Express were removed by directors as 
result of pressure from big institutional investors). 
 176. See Ethan S. Bernstein, All’s Fair in Love, War & Bankruptcy? Corpo-
rate Governance Implications of CEO Turnover in Financial Distress, 11 STAN. 
J.L., BUS. & FIN. 299, 303, 308 (2006); Stuart C. Gilson, Management Turnover 
and Financial Distress, 25 J. FIN. ECON. 241, 261 (1989). 
 177. See Stuart C. Gilson, Bankruptcy, Boards, Banks and Blockholders: 
Evidence on Changes in Corporate Ownership and Control When Firms De-
fault, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 355, 369–72 & 371 tbl.5, 386 (1990); Gilson, supra note 
176, at 246–48 & 247 tbl.3; LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 54, at 723 (finding 
a change in CEOs of large, corporate debtors in ninety-one percent of cases 
studied).  
 178. See Sam Kennedy, Can RCN Chief David McCourt Hang onto Job in 
Bankruptcy?, MORNING CALL (Allentown, Penn.), June 1, 2004, at D1; see also 
Noted…, WALL. ST. J., Jun. 13, 2007, at B10 (revealing that Brad Morrice, 
CEO and board member of New Century Financial Corp., was fired without 
cause and immediately replaced two months after New Century filed for bank-
ruptcy). 
 179. See Robert J. Grossman, Holding Back Bankruptcy, HR MAG., May 
2003, at 44, 46–47, available at http://www.shrm.org/hrmagazine/articles/ 
0503/0503covstory.asp. 
 180. See id. 
 181. Bernstein, supra note 176, at 311. 
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managers once the firm filed for bankruptcy.182 Moreover, since 
lenders often want to send a message to new investors that the 
firm is on track to rehabilitate itself, they have an incentive to 
remove the managers who ostensibly derailed the firm and sent 
it into bankruptcy. For whatever reason, shareholders and 
lenders (especially DIP financiers) increasingly are demanding 
greater rights to name or remove managers and directors and 
to force the firm to retain financial advisors selected by the 
lenders.183 Directors are rarely removed before the petition is 
filed, even in prenegotiated or prepackaged reorganization pro-
ceedings controlled by the debtor’s principal creditor.184 Direc-
tors who did not resign before the filing are, however, almost 
always replaced with directors selected by the firm’s creditors 
or new owners.185 Others agree to resign in exchange for an 
agreement not to have a public trustee appointed.186 Thus, 
while the managers of some megafirms were not fired until af-
ter the filing (despite allegations of fraud or mismanage-
ment),187 even managers who are not replaced before the com-
 
 182. See supra Part III.A.1. 
 183. See Miller & Waisman, supra note 160, at 183 (contending that cash 
collateral agreements give creditors the power to place a “stranglehold” on 
debtors); Harvey R. Miller & Shai Y. Waisman, The Creditor in Possession: 
Creditor Control of Chapter 11 Reorganization Cases, BANK. STRATEGIST, Nov. 
2003, at 1; Skeel, supra note 143, at 922, 926, 931 (describing the trend to-
wards increased lender control of corporate governance in Chapter 11 cases 
and the cabining of the power of directors and managers). 
 184. See Gilson, supra note 176, at 370 tbl.5. 
 185. See Matthew Wong, Bankruptcy as a Risk Management Tool: Econom-
ic and Social Implications, REV. OF BUS., Sept. 22, 2003, at 46, 49, 51 n.13 (cit-
ing a study finding that fifty-four percent of the companies’ directors leave 
near the time of the bankruptcy filing); see also John D. Ayer, The Role of 
Finance Theory in Shaping Bankruptcy Policy, 3 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 53, 
78 n.99 (1995) (citing statistics regarding replacement of board of directors); 
Baird & Rasmussen, Chapter 11 at Twilight, supra note 138, at 697 & n.79 
(“[D]irectors of these businesses do not survive.”); Brian L. Betker et al., 
“Warm with Sunny Skies”: Disclosure Statement Forecasts, 73 AM. BANKR. L.J. 
809, 826 (1999) (estimating boards change seventy percent of members during 
reorganization); Gilson, supra note 177, at 386 (“On average, only 46% of in-
cumbent directors and 43% of CEOs remain with their firms at the conclusion 
of the bankruptcy or debt restructuring.”). 
 186. Terry Brennan, Refco Spared Ch. 11 Trustee, DAILY DEAL, Jan. 12, 
2006, 2006 WLNR 618273. 
 187. See In re Adelphia Commc’n Corp., No. 02-41729, 2003 WL 22316543, 
at *1–5 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Mar. 4, 2003) (notwithstanding the financial scan-
dals associated with the Adelphia Communications Corp. bankruptcy, senior 
management was not replaced until after the filing). Likewise, Ken Lay did 
not resign as CEO of Enron until January 23, 2002, more than a month after 
the bankruptcy petition was filed on December 2, 2001. Robert Schlesinger, 
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pany files for bankruptcy often lose their jobs before the Chap-
ter 11 plan is confirmed.188 
IV. THE NEW “PRIVATE” TRUSTEE  
Congress rejected the Act’s statutory trustee-controlled 
model189 because of the view that managers did not create the 
firm’s financial problems, and also because a public trustee 
would be unfamiliar with the debtor’s business.190 Though the 
Code makes it easier to appoint a trustee, appointments of pub-
lic trustees remain rare and officers are not always forced to re-
sign once the bankruptcy petition is filed.191 However, manag-
ers increasingly are forced to share control of the business 
during the reorganization proceeding with court-appointed ex-
aminers and with a chief restructuring officer (CRO) or other 
entity that often lacks experience working in the firm’s indus-
try.192 Indeed, perhaps the biggest change in manager control is 
the increasing trend by lenders to suggest that the company vo-
luntarily193 hire a turnaround or crisis manager or CRO imme-
diately before or just after the bankruptcy filing.194 
 
Enron Chief Executive Lay Resigns, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 24, 2002, at A2. 
 188. See, e.g., In re Mortgage Inv. Co., 111 B.R. 604, 612 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 
1990) (refusing to find the manager of a company in Chapter 11 incompetent 
despite governmental investigation of his role in a savings and loan venture). 
 189. See SKEEL, supra note 47, at 177–78; Miller & Waisman, supra note 
160, at 176. 
 190. Cf. Skeel, supra note 143, at 927 (noting that for the very same rea-
sons creditors are hesitant to replace managers). 
 191. See id. 
 192. See Miller & Waisman, supra note 160, at 186–87 (suggesting that the 
“Chief Restructuring Officer” is the reincarnation of another entity that credi-
tors sought to have appointed to control the firm, the “responsible officer”). 
 193. See Mark V. Bossi, Are CROs More Powerful than Turnaround Con-
sultants? Creditors Drive Trend Toward New Title, J. CORP. RENEWAL, Oct. 
2006, at 1, available at http://www.turnaround.org/Publications/Articles.aspx? 
objectID=6588 (describing the processes creditors have used to influence com-
panies to “voluntarily” retain turnaround professionals); Miller & Waisman, 
supra note 160, at 186–87 (discussing the ways in which lenders benefit from 
the appointment of a chief restructuring officer). Lenders likely will not overt-
ly demand that debtors hire a specific person to be the CRO because of con-
cerns with lender liability. See, e.g., 1 WILLIAM L. WALLANDER & JEREMY B. 
COFFEY, LENDER LIABILITY LAW AND LITIGATION § 8.10[3][b] (1989 & Supp. 
2008). For similar reasons, lenders will avoid dictating how the CRO should 
run the debtor’s day-to-day operations. See, e.g., Boyd v. Sachs (In re Auto 
Specialties Mfg. Co.), 153 B.R. 457, 478–81 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1993). See gen-
erally Baird & Rasmussen, Missing Lever, supra note 140, at 1235–36 (dis-
cussing concerns lenders would have with ordering companies to hire a specif-
ic CRO). 
 194. See William H. Henrich, The Role of the CRO in Debtor/Lender Com-
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A. RETAINING THE PRIVATE TRUSTEE 
The Code does not mention CROs, which are entities that 
are not exactly chief financial officers or chief executive offic-
ers.195 Indeed, until recently, the term “CRO” was not even 
mentioned in published judicial opinions.196 CROs play various 
roles in bankruptcy cases and have duties that are sometimes 
limited, like helping to secure future financing, but at other 
times are comprehensive, like running the company.197 Despite 
their increased presence in bankruptcy cases since the early 
2000s, neither the Bankruptcy Act nor the Code anticipated 
that debtors would be controlled by managers who were not 
hired as employees of the firm and were not appointed by the 
court as a public trustee. CROs and other privatized trustees 
now routinely serve as the debtor’s representative during the 
bankruptcy case, oversee the development of financial projec-
tions, disseminate information to parties in interest, oversee 
the sale of assets, and prepare and negotiate the reorganization 
plan with creditor, bondholder, and equity committees.198 
 
munications in Bankruptcy, AM. BANKR. INST. J., July–Aug. 2004, at 20 (“Like 
the emergency room physician, the CRO seldom arrives on a cheerful scene.”). 
 195. Cf. Anthony Horvat, Defining the Role of the CRO: The Strategic and 
Tactical Benefits of a Seasoned Professional, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Sept. 2005, 
at 46–47 (noting that while “there is no consensus in the definition [of CRO],” 
one appropriate responsibility is managing the financial aspects of the compa-
ny); Miller & Waisman, supra note 160, at 186 (“The CRO is vested with ex-
ecutive decision making powers and direct access to the debtor’s governing 
body.”). 
 196. A search of Lexis and Westlaw databases shows no opinions using the 
term prior to 2000. The earliest online decision that mentions a CRO appears 
to be Clyde Bergemann, Inc. v. Babcock & Wilcox Co. (In re Babcock & Wilcox), 
No.00-1154, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6448, at *17 (E.D. La. May 3, 2000). The 
first reported opinion to use the phrase “Chief Restructuring Officer” appears 
to be Clyde Bergemann, Inc. v. Babcock & Wilcox Co. (In re Babcock & Wilcox 
Co.), 250 F.3d 955, 959 n.8 (5th Cir. 2001). 
 197. See James H.M. Sprayregen et al., Chapter 11: Not Perfect, But Better 
Than the Alternatives, J. BANKR. L. & PRAC., Dec. 2005, at 3, 24–25 (surveying 
the range of services CROs can provide and noting how this can vary on a case 
by case basis). 
 198. See Daniel F. Dooley, CROs Can Be Driving Force for Good Corporate 
Governance, J. CORP. RENEWAL, Oct. 2007, at 14, available at http://www 
.turnaround.org/Publications/Articles.aspx?objectID=8111 (explaining the is-
sues CROs must address); Richard E. Mikels & Charles W. Azano, “The More 
Things Change.” Reflections on 34 Years of Practice, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Oct. 
2006, at 22, 70 (describing the expanding role of the CRO); Jonathan Berke, 
For Interstate, Ch. 11 No Cakewalk, DAILY DEAL, Sept. 23, 2004, 2004 WLNR 
4656456 (stating that the manufacturer of Twinkies hired both its interim 
CEO and CRO from a crisis management firm and that the two will likely al-
ter the company’s distribution model); Candy Corporation Crumbles, BANKR. 
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Though they at times appear to serve as surrogates for a court-
appointed trustee or examiner, they are predisposed to favor 
only one entity involved in the debtor’s Chapter 11 reorganiza-
tion: the creditor who was responsible for getting them hired.199 
Indeed, in most instances, the privatized trustee reports direct-
ly to the firm’s board of directors, not to the CEO or other man-
agers.200 
While lenders likely would not force a firm to hire the 
lenders’ chosen manager, the request to fire existing managers 
and hire new ones often is coupled with the lenders’ refusal to 
continue to support financially struggling firms unless the firm 
complies with the request.201 In addition, once the firm files for 
bankruptcy, creditors often insist that the DIP financing or 
cash collateral order require the debtor to appoint a CRO, who 
 
CT. DECISIONS WKLY. NEWS & COMMENT, Feb. 10, 2004, at A2 (discussing 
comments of the CRO of Archibald Candy Corp.); Firms’ Teamwork Leads to 
Smooth Asset Sale for Piccadilly’s, BANKR. CT. DECISIONS WKLY. NEWS & 
COMMENT, Apr. 27, 2004, at A7 (reporting that CRO of Piccadilly was a man-
aging director of Phoenix Management Services); IMPATH Reorganization 
Cooperation Culminates in Sale of Division, BANKR. CT. DECISIONS WKLY. 
NEWS & COMMENT, Jun. 1, 2004, at A8 (discussing Crossroads LLC, IM-
PATH’s restructuring advisors, and its accomplishments, including the sale of 
business units and the stabilization of operations in the face of financial inves-
tigations); Judge Barr Praises Professionals in Centis Bankruptcy, BANKR. CT. 
DECISIONS WKLY. NEWS & COMMENT, Jul. 27, 2004, at A5 (commending the 
work of bankruptcy professionals in formulating and enacting a liquidation 
plan); Pathway Strategic Partners to Reorganize Waterman Industries, BANKR. 
CT. DECISIONS WKLY. NEWS & COMMENT, May 4, 2004, at A2 (announcing 
that principal of Pathway Strategic Partners LLC would serve as CRO of Wa-
terman Industries); Penthouse Publisher Goes Bust, BANKR. CT. DECISIONS 
WKLY. NEWS & COMMENT, Aug. 26, 2003, at A2 (announcing appointment of 
managing partner of Corporate Revitalization Partners LLC as CRO of Gener-
al Media Inc.); The Spiegel Group Sells Self-Named Catalog, BANKR. CT. DE-
CISIONS WKLY. NEWS & COMMENT, June 9, 2004, at A2 (discussing CRO’s role 
in the sale of a company’s assets). 
 199. See, e.g., In re Colad Group, Inc., 324 B.R. 208, 215 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 
2005) (noting that the debtor selected the proposed consultant based on the 
secured creditor’s recommendation); Mikels & Azano, supra note 198, at 70 
(noting that lenders often require firms to employ a CRO and “obviously, it is 
more beneficial for creditors than for the debtor to have in place managers 
with less allegiance to shareholders and other management”). 
 200. Baird & Rasmussen, Missing Lever, supra note 140, at 1234; Henrich, 
supra note 194, at 20. 
 201. See Bucki, supra note 146, at 392–93 (describing the wide range of 
powers a lender has over the debtor, including the power to insist upon the 
appointment of a CRO); Mikels & Azano, supra note 198, at 70 (describing the 
relationship between the debtor, CRO, and lender when the appointment of a 
CRO is required by the lender); Bert Weil, Building Value Requires Address-
ing Host of Issues, J. OF CORP. RENEWAL, Oct. 2004, at 4, 5. 
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often is selected or strongly recommended by the creditor and 
who meets privately with (and often reports to) the creditor. 
Advocates of this management structure contend that turna-
round specialists who serve in the role of CRO can devise an ob-
jective strategic plan to guide a financially troubled company 
back to solvency while allowing existing managers to focus on 
the firm’s day-to-day operations.202 
Rather than seek the appointment of a public trustee, 
lenders and investors have embraced the concept of replacing 
managers with private turnaround specialists, ostensibly be-
cause of the specialists’ expertise in operating financially dis-
tressed businesses.203 Courts now routinely approve requests to 
hire turnaround specialists, crisis managers, and other profes-
sionals to serve as the CEO, CFO, or CRO of the company dur-
ing the Chapter 11 proceeding.204 For example, in 1995 and 
 
 202. Horvat, supra note 195, at 46; AM. BANKR. INST. J., SEPT. 2005, at 46, 
46; see also AlixPartners, Bankruptcy Reorganization, http://www.alixpartners 
.com/EN/Services/BankruptcyReorganization/tabid/296/Default.aspx (last vi-
sited Dec. 2, 2008). 
 203. James H.M. Sprayregen et al., Chapter 11: Not Perfect, But Better 
Than The Alternatives, J. BANKR. L. & PRAC., 2005 , at 3, 24–25 (arguing that 
CROs are able to tailor their role to fit the circumstances of the bankruptcy, 
thereby increasing both efficiency and success). Some of these CROs have run 
companies with wildly different business operations. For example, Robert 
Dangremond of AlixPartners was the CEO of Refco (financial services compa-
ny), CRO of Harnischfeger Industries (manufacturer, servicer, and distributor 
of surface mining products), CRO of Mirant (energy supplier), CFO of Zenith 
(home electronics), and CEO of Forstmann and Co. (private equity firm). Alix-
Partners, Profile of Robert Dangremond, http://www.alixpartners.com/EN/ 
Professionals/ManagingDirectors/tabid/132/ModID/482/EmployeeID/30/ 
Display/Bio/Default.aspx (last visited Dec. 2, 2008). John Boken of Kroll Zolfo 
Cooper is the CEO and CRO of TOUSA (homebuilder) and was the CRO of 
Collins & Aikman (auto parts supplier) and President and COO of NRG Ener-
gy (energy supplier). Kroll Zolfo Cooper, Profile of John Boken, http://www 
.krollzolfocooper.com/professionals/managingdirectors/boken/ (last visited Dec. 
2, 2008). Of course, the availability of a pool of managers who have experience 
running or reorganizing distressed businesses casts into doubt the continued 
validity of the Code’s antitrustee, manager-controlled presumption. The exis-
tence of these experienced turnaround specialists means that the replacement 
of managers might not delay the reorganization or deprive Chapter 11 debtors 
of experienced turnaround managers. But cf. In re Adelphia Commc’ns Corp., 
No. 02-41792, 2003 WL 22316543, at *4 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Mar. 4, 2003) (not-
ing that installing senior management with extensive experience in the indus-
try would help the debtor “chart a strategic direction and a long-term business 
plan around which a plan of reorganization may be structured”). 
 204. Debtors who have used turnaround professionals include APS Holding 
Corp., Enron, Federated Department Stores, Harischfeger Industries, Kmart, 
Laidlaw, LTV Steel Company, Penn Traffic Co., Polaroid, Sunbeam, Wheeling 
Pittsburgh Steel Corp, and WorldCom. Robin E. Keller, How to Get the Most 
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1996 there was not a single CRO hired in any of the twenty 
largest Chapter 11 filings. Within the last ten years, however, 
hiring a CRO has become commonplace and CROs have been 
retained in approximately thirty percent of the largest Chapter 
11 filings.205 
CROs have been hired as officers, statutory trustees, and 
professionals.206 Because professionals typically are required to 
report to the firm’s officers or board of directors and to act at 
their discretion, however, creditors prefer to hire these manag-
ers as officers.207 When asked to approve a debtor’s request to 
hire a CRO as an officer rather than a professional who would 
be subject to court (and creditor) scrutiny, courts often ignore 
the turnaround manager’s title and instead consider the sub-
stance of the manager’s duties. In deciding whether a turna-
round specialist is actually a disinterested professional whose 
retention and compensation must be approved by the court, 
courts have used both a qualitative and quantitative analysis. 
Courts generally consider the role the person would play in the 
reorganization case and will find the person to be a professional 
if she will play a central or significant role in the administra-
tion of the Chapter 11 proceeding208 or will have discretion and 
autonomy in administering some aspect of the debtor’s es-
tate.209 
An individual hired as senior management is often treated 
as a professional if the individual’s primary employment is with 
a consulting or insolvency firm and the individual does not 
 
From Crisis Manager Within the Limits of the Bankruptcy Code, BANKR. 
STRATEGIST, May 2001, at 1, 1; Elizabeth Douglass, Worldcom Hires Turna-
round Experts, L.A. TIMES, July 30, 2002, at C3; Alison Maitland, Clearing Up 
After the Visionaries, FIN. TIMES (London), Jan. 30, 2003, at 12; Judith 
Schoolman, Kmart May Fail Survival Test, DAILY NEWS (N.Y.), Jan. 24, 2003, 
at 37; Tracy Turner, Big Bear Parent Names Chairman, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, 
Sept. 5, 2003, at E1. 
 205. See THE BANKRUPTCY YEARBOOK & ALMANAC (1995–2007), (5th to 
17th eds. 1995–2007). The Almanac compiles data for the twenty largest 
bankruptcies, including trustee and examiner appointments and changes in 
management. 
 206. See, e.g., In re Metro. Elec. Mfg. Co., 295 B.R. 7, 9 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 
2003); In re Bartley Lindsay Co., 120 B.R. 507, 512 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1990). 
 207. See Bossi, supra, note 193, at 1. 
 208. In re Federal Mogul-Global, Inc., 348 F.3d 390, 404 (3d Cir. 2003); In 
re CNH, Inc., 304 B.R. 177, 179 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 2004); In re Seatrain Lines, 
Inc., 13 B.R. 980, 981 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1981). 
 209. In re ACANDS, Inc., 297 B.R. 395, 402 (Bankr. D. Del. 2003); Bicoas-
tal Corp. v. Clear (In re Bicoastal Corp.), 149 B.R. 216, 218 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 
1993). 
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work full time for the debtor; if the individual is retained by the 
debtor contemporaneously with or immediately following the 
bankruptcy filing; if the individual’s compensation is paid to 
the consulting firm; or if the individual has been hired on an 
interim basis to work through the debtor’s immediate financial 
problems.210 Thus, though firms, their primary creditors, and 
the privatized trustees themselves may resist labeling the new 
manager as a professional, some courts conclude that even 
when new managers are hired to serve as officers of a debtor 
firm, they are professionals who may be paid only after the 
court approves their application for compensation.211 
Even if CROs or other privatized trustees provide value, 
other parties in interest have the right to full information 
about their employment status, the amount of control they 
have over the business reorganization, and any potential agen-
cy conflicts created by their relationship with other parties in 
interest in the case. 
B. BENEFITS, COSTS, AND AGENCY CONFLICTS 
The Code does not explain what debtors must show to war-
rant hiring a CRO or any other private trustee, what proce-
dures must be used to hire one, to whom the private trustee 
must report, or whether shareholders or creditors have the 
right to vote to replace a private trustee during the reorganiza-
tion proceeding.212 Who has the right to replace managers and 
professionals during the bankruptcy case is critical, since the 
replacements will have an incentive to favor the position of the 
party who controls their retention even if the manager under-
stands that the Code imposes on her ethical obligations to other 
parties involved in the case.213 Courts have allowed entities 
 
 210. In re Madison Mgmt. Group, Inc., 137 B.R. 275, 283–84 (Bankr. N.D. 
Ill. 1992); In re Bartley Lindsay Co., 120 B.R. 507, 512 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1990).  
 211. See, e.g., Madison, 137 B.R. at 284; Bartley, 120 B.R. at 512–13; see 
also Keller, supra note 204, at 1. Some courts have concluded that turnaround 
specialists who were hired before the bankruptcy filing and who serve as offic-
ers and make all relevant business decisions for the firm are not professionals 
whose retention must be approved by the court. See, e.g., In re Phoenix Steel 
Corp., 110 B.R. 141, 142 (Bankr. D. Del. 1989).  
 212. Cf. Turnaround Managers Discuss Lessons from Merry-Go-Round, 
BANKR. CT. DECISIONS WKLY. NEWS & COMMENT, Dec. 18, 2001, at A1 (dis-
cussing that the role of the CRO is not clearly defined by the Code and that 
the engagement letter needs to clearly define the CRO’s authority and respon-
sibility). 
 213. While the case law is mixed, there is strong support for the argument 
that shareholders retain the right to call meetings even after the Chapter 11 
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that are hired as professionals to serve as the debtor company’s 
CEO even though the professionals typically are not employees 
of the debtor. Indeed, privatized trustees almost always are re-
ferred to as independent contractors and they often are em-
ployed by other entities.214 CROs who are members of turna-
round firms almost always retain their affiliations with those 
entities,215 and typically are paid through their turnaround 
firms (or other related entities) even as they serve as CRO or 
CEO of a Chapter 11 debtor. For example, the motion to hire 
the CRO in the Enron bankruptcy requested the court to enter 
an order pursuant to § 363 of the Code authorizing Enron to 
“[e]nter into an [a]greement to [e]mploy Stephen Forbes Coop-
er, LLC as an [i]ndependent [c]ontractor to [p]rovide 
[m]anagement [s]ervices for the [d]ebtor.”216 
 
filing. See Manville Corp. v. Equity Sec. Holders Comm. (In re Johns-Manville 
Corp.), 801 F.2d 60, 64 (2d Cir. 1986); Official Bondholders Comm. v. Chase 
Manhatten Bank (In re Marvel Entm’t Group, Inc.), 209 B.R. 832, 838–40 (D. 
Del. 1997); In re Heck’s Props., Inc., 151 B.R. 739, 757–60 (S.D. W. Va. 1992). 
Other courts have found that allowing a stockholder meeting may interfere 
with a bankruptcy case and should be enjoined. See, e.g., In re Potter Instru-
ment Co., 593 F.2d 470, 475 (2d Cir. 1979); In re Quail Aero Service, Inc., 755 
N.Y.S.2d 103, 105 (App. Div. 2002); In re Bicoastal Corp., No. 89-8191-8P1, 
1989 WL 607352 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. Nov. 21, 1989); see also Chaim J. Fortgang 
& Thomas Moers Mayer, Trading Claims and Taking Control of Corporations 
in Chapter 11, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 68–73 (1990) (arguing that shareholder 
meetings should routinely be enjoined). See generally Mark E. Budnitz, Chap-
ter 11 Business Reorganizations and Shareholder Meetings: Will the Meeting 
Please Come to Order, or Should the Meeting Be Cancelled Altogether?, 58 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1214 (1990) (tracing the case law concerning shareholder 
meetings in the bankruptcy context and proposing a new test to determine if 
meetings should be enjoined or permitted). 
 214. See, e.g., Sea Containers, Ltd., Current Report (Form 8-K), exhibit 
10.1 at 13 (Apr. 18, 2007); McLeodUSA, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K), ex-
hibit 10.4 at 1 (Aug. 12, 2005); Integrated Health Servs., Inc., Current Report 
(Form 8-K), exhibit 10.3 at 6 (July 27, 2000); Final Order Pursuant to 11 
U.S.C. § 363 Authorizing the Continued Employment of AP Services, LLC as 
Crisis Managers to the Debtors and the Designation of Ted Stenger as Chief 
Restructuring Officer of the Debtors, In re Dana Corp., No. 06-10354 (Bankr. 
S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2006) (all creating an independent contractor relationship 
between the debtor and the consulting firm). 
 215. The Mirant Corporation bankruptcy provides a standard illustration 
of CRO compensation. Mirant paid AlixPartners, LLC directly for an Alix-
Partners principal’s service as Chief Restructuring Officer. Mirant Corp., An-
nual Report (Form 10-K), at 105 (Mar. 15, 2005). 
 216. Order Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 363 Authorizing the Debtors to Enter 
Into an Agreement to Employ Stephen Forbes Cooper, LLC as an Independent 
Contractor to Provide Management Services for the Debtors Nunc Pro Tunc to 
January 28, 2002, In re Enron Corp., No. 01-16034 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Apr. 4, 
2002), 2002 WL 32150520. 
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Mr. Cooper was hired as the CRO and CEO of Enron but 
remained a principal of Kroll Zolfo Cooper, a “risk consulting 
firm” that provides turnaround consulting and risk and crisis 
management. He also served as a CRO for other companies 
while serving as Enron’s CRO.217 Ironically, while the CRO in 
Enron was not an Enron employee,218 the CRO and the others 
hired to assist the CRO were entitled to indemnification under 
Enron’s directors’ and officers’ liability insurance policies. Oth-
er large firms that also agreed to provide indemnification to a 
CRO (or the CRO’s consulting firm) include Integrated Health 
Services, Inc., American Business Financial Services, Inc., and 
Dana Corporation.219 In effect, these private trustees had all 
the powers of a corporate officer, had control of the business 
during the restructuring proceeding, and had limited liability 
as a result of those powers—but had no explicit fiduciary duties 
to other creditors or parties with interests in the bankruptcy 
case.220 
Allowing a firm to hire a private trustee when the firm al-
ready has hired other professionals or when an examiner has 
been appointed by the court is also problematic because it can 
dramatically increase costs. For example, Enron had an ex-
 
 217. Maitland, supra note 204; Paul Nowell, Krispy Kreme Ousts CEO in 
Turnaround Bid, WASH. POST, Jan. 19, 2005, at E3 (announcing Cooper’s in-
stallment as CEO of Krispy Kreme while he continued to serve as CEO of 
Enron). 
 218. Stephen Cooper, Enron’s CRO, was paid by his limited liability com-
pany, SFCooper, LLC. Order Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 363 Authorizing the 
Debtors to Enter Into an Agreement to Employ Stephen Forbes Cooper, LLC 
as an Independent Contractor to Provide Management Services for the Deb-
tors Nunc Pro Tunc to January 28, 2002, In re Enron Corp., No. 01-16034 
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Apr. 4, 2002), 2002 WL 32150520. 
 219. See Sea Containers, Ltd., Current Report (Form 8-K), exhibit 10.1 at 
13 (Apr. 18, 2007); McLeodUSA, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K), exhibit 10.4 
at 1 (Aug. 12, 2005); Am. Bus. Fin. Servs., Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K/A), 
exhibit 10.2 at 5–6 (Mar. 10, 2005); Integrated Health Servs., Inc., Current 
Report (Form 8-K), exhibit 10.3 at 7 (July 27, 2000); Letter from Ted Stenger, 
Managing Director of AP Services, LLC to Michael L. DeBacker, Vice Presi-
dent, Dana Corporation (Mar. 2, 2006), reprinted in Application of the Debtors 
and Debtors in Possession Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 363 for Entry of (I) An In-
terim Order Authorizing the Employment of AP Services, LLC as Crisis Man-
agers to the Debtors and the Designation of Ted Stenger as Chief Restructur-
ing Officer of the Debtors and Scheduling Final Hearing on Proposed 
Employment Agreement, and (II) A Final Order Authorizing Same, In re Dana 
Corp., No. 06-10354 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Mar. 3, 2006) 
 220. The CRO and CFO in WorldCom also remained members of the same 
consulting firm even as they served as officers of WorldCom. Elizabeth Doug-
lass, Worldcom Hires Turnaround Experts, L.A. TIMES, July 30, 2002, at C3. 
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aminer and a CRO, both of whom helped to investigate and un-
ravel Enron’s complex financial transactions and its use of 
business partnerships to conceal debt.221 Enron’s examiner was 
paid $90 million to investigate Enron’s prepetition activities 
with its managers, lawyers, banks, and accountants.222 The 
original contract to hire the CRO obligated Enron to pay $1.32 
million annually for the CRO’s services, $1.2 million annually 
for the services of up to fifteen other members of a turnaround 
firm, and a minimum $5 million “success fee.”223 After objec-
tions by the SEC and other creditors, this amount was reduced 
to $1.2 million annually for the CRO and $800,000 for the asso-
ciates. The turnaround firm had been paid $63.4 million in fees 
when it requested a $25 million success fee for the CRO’s and 
associates’ work in the case.224 While this compensation may be 
comparable to fees paid to consultants who provided manage-
ment services to nondebtor businesses, the motion to employ 
the CRO in Enron as an independent contractor to provide 
management services did not provide proof that the proposed 
compensation was market-based. Moreover, it is not clear 
whether the CRO, examiner and creditors committee performed 
similar functions or tasks during the bankruptcy.225 
Having the privatized trustee report to and be controlled 
by only one secured creditor exacerbates agency problems since 
the trustee has little incentive to protect the interests of the 
parties who face the greatest losses in bankruptcy cases, name-
ly, the unsecured creditors. In addition, in some instances, the 
amount of fees the private trustee (and the associates she 
hires) receives from the debtor directly impacts the profitability 
 
 221. Firm Requests ‘Success Fee’ in Enron Case, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 2004, 
at C2; Carrie Johnson, Interim Chief At Enron Asks for $25 Million, WASH. 
POST, Sept. 4, 2004, at E1. 
 222. Firm Requests ‘Success Fee’ in Enron Case, supra note 221. 
 223. The CRO eventually petitioned the court to hire even more employees 
from the turnaround firm. Eric Berger, Enron Finds Bills Pile Up as Cash 
Drains, HOUS. CHRON., Oct. 25, 2002, at Bus. 1 (reporting that the bankruptcy 
judge approved a request to hire fifteen more restructuring experts). 
 224. Pacelle, supra note 131. 
 225. WorldCom also had an Examiner, a CRO, a CEO, and an active credi-
tors committee. The CRO in WorldCom, though not paid as handsomely as 
Enron’s CRO, also asked for a $7 million “success” bonus for the CRO and 
CFO (who were both employed by the same risk management firm). See Jona-
than D. Glater, In Scandals, Another High Price to Pay, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 
2002, at C1. 
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of the turnaround firm.226 This creates yet another agency con-
flict. It also gives the private trustee an incentive to pursue its 
own economic interest to the detriment of other parties in-
volved in the bankruptcy case. 
Creditors and the Office of the United States Trustee have 
objected to the retention of these private trustees, citing private 
trustees’ conflicts and the amount of money the trustees and 
their firms have charged in Chapter 11 cases. Some critics have 
argued that private trustees cannot be disinterested if mem-
bers of the private trustee’s consulting firm have been hired 
both as professionals and as officers of the debtor, or if mem-
bers of the firm served as officers of the debtor before the bank-
ruptcy case was filed. Objections also have been filed where the 
debtor had employed the consulting firm before the filing, or 
because the private trustee’s actual employer (the consulting 
firm) sought an equity interest in the debtor.227 Parties also 
have objected because the debtor did not propose to hire the 
private trustee either as a professional or an officer but instead 
sought to employ the person in a manner not recognized by the 
Code.228 
The potential conflicts and the uncertainty created when 
members of a turnaround firm are hired to serve as CROs or 
CEOs in bankruptcy cases caused the United States Trustee in 
one region to negotiate a protocol with a major turnaround firm 
that prevents that firm from serving in more than one capacity 
or switching roles in a case, and from being retained by the 
debtor if anyone affiliated with the turnaround firm sat on the 
debtor’s board within the preceding two years.229 Under the 
protocol, the turnaround firm may not be retained as both a 
professional under § 327 and as an officer under § 363.230 It al-
so gives the court the explicit authority to review the private 
trustee’s compensation and fees under a reasonableness stan-
dard, but it does not impose any explicit duty on the turna-
 
 226. For example, media reports suggest that increasing the number of as-
sociates from the CRO’s turnaround firm who worked for Enron helped bolster 
the turnaround firm’s profit targets and ultimately would increase the CRO’s 
bonus from the turnaround firm. See Barboza, supra note 127. 
 227. See, e.g., In re Bidermann Indus., U.S.A., Inc., 203 B.R. 547, 549, 553–
54 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1997). 
 228. See Keller, supra note 204, at 1. 
 229. See U.S. Trustee Program, Protocol for Engagement of Jay Alix & As-
sociates and Affiliates, at 1–2, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/ust/r02/docs/ 
chapt11/manhattan_retention/Jay_Alix_Protocol.doc. 
 230. Id. at 1. 
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round expert to consider the interests of all parties in the bank-
ruptcy case.231 
V. CLARIFYING PRIVATE TRUSTEES’ ETHICAL DUTIES  
The private trustee model that firms are now using is in-
consistent with the Code’s presumption that prepetition man-
agers will be allowed to control the firm during the bankruptcy 
proceeding. If, as seems to be the case, creditors have lost con-
fidence in the managers’ ability to run the firm, if they feel 
managers are unable to fulfill their fiduciary duties to all par-
ties in interest, or if they believe the firm’s prebankruptcy 
managers are incompetent, they can exercise their right under 
the Code to have those managers replaced by a public trus-
tee.232 Creditors’ circumvention of the Code’s presumption that 
either existing managers should be allowed to control the firm 
or a public trustee should be appointed to replace unfit manag-
ers creates inherent conflicts of interest and gives private trus-
tees an incentive to ignore the interests of all parties involved 
in the case, with the notable exception of the interests of the 
party that cause it to be retained. 
While serving as CROs or CEOs, privatized trustees often 
control the daily operations of many debtor firms but remain 
principals of their consulting firms, commonly serving in con-
junction with existing management (i.e., the debtor’s CEO) or 
with a court-appointed examiner.233 This overlapping manage-
ment structure is not consistent with Chapter 11’s statutory 
provisions, which anticipate that there will be one of the follow-
ing: a DIP (and perhaps an examiner), or a public trustee (and 
not an examiner). Moreover, having a DIP and a private trus-
tee or a private trustee and an examiner unnecessarily increas-
es the costs associated with the reorganization. 
Because the use of private trustees is a relatively new phe-
nomenon, and because they are retained under circumstances 
that fail to give other parties an adequate opportunity to ques-
tion the retention, the fiduciary duties of private trustees are 
murky and agency problems are rampant. While some courts 
 
 231. Id. at 3. 
 232. 11 U.S.C. § 1104 (2000 & Supp. 2006). 
 233. 2 AlixPartners Specialists Will Oversee Turnaround at WorldCom, 
BANKR. CT. DECISIONS WKLY. NEWS & COMMENT, Aug. 13, 2002, at A1, avail-
able at Westlaw, 39 No. 21 BCD (LRP) 1. (reporting that WorldCom hired two 
principals of a turnaround firm as its CRO and CFO, that these individuals 
reported to the CEO, and that an examiner had been named in the case). 
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and commentators have suggested that a turnaround specialist 
who also serves as the CEO or other top-level manager should 
have some type of fiduciary duties,234 private trustees do not 
appear to have the same obligations as public trustees despite 
their apparently unlimited powers to control the firm. That is, 
they typically have limited liability and may have a right to be 
indemnified for their actions,235 yet have no clear duties to ei-
ther the debtor or any creditor other than the one who may 
have insisted that they be hired. 
Agency problems exist because other parties in interest 
cannot effectively supervise or monitor the managers’ perfor-
mance or routinely object to their compensation. Indeed, if 
managers are not required to disclose their relationships with 
other parties in interest, the court cannot adequately supervise 
a manager to evaluate her loyalty to the estate. Likewise, with-
out requiring managers to disclose their relationships with oth-
ers involved in the case, courts are less likely to be able to pre-
vent improper conduct or to determine whether the manager’s 
request for compensation is reasonable. Because private trus-
tees usually avoid being hired as professionals under § 327, 
once the court approves the motion to retain their services and 
to pay the compensation provided in their contract, creditors 
and other parties in interest typically cannot object to their 
compensation or to the fees that the debtor firm pays for addi-
tional consultants. 
Perhaps the easiest way to eliminate the agency costs and 
conflicts of interest associated with privatized trustees would 
be to prevent them from exercising any control over business 
debtors. This ban could be justified on the theory that the agen-
cy conflicts these private trustees have when they are allowed 
to control the reorganization proceeding will be greater than 
the conflicts managers already have when they are balancing 
the interests of shareholders or certain creditors (like trade 
creditors or suppliers) who are likely to support keeping the 
firm intact (and retaining the current managers) with those of 
other creditors (like distressed debt traders or hedge funds) 
who might prefer liquidating the firm.236 While preventing 
 
 234. In re Bidermann Indus. U.S.A., Inc., 203 B.R. 547, 551–52 (Bankr. 
S.D.N.Y. 1997); Ethical Decisions About Cash May Result in Lawsuits, BANKR. 
CT. DECISIONS WKLY. NEWS & COMMENT, Dec. 18, 2001, at A3 (noting prob-
lems involved when the CRO is also an officer or fiduciary of the firm). 
 235. See supra notes 179–80 and accompanying text. 
 236. See Bienenstock, supra note 76, at 544–47 (discussing incentives that 
affect managers’ and trustees’ negotiations during Chapter 11 reorganiza-
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firms from hiring private trustees might reduce agency costs 
and eliminate conflicting loyalties, this ultimately may not be 
in the best interest of the debtor because it might prevent busi-
nesses from hiring professionals with the expertise and talent 
needed to help the business reorganize in Chapter 11. Moreo-
ver, all managers face some conflicts because they must bal-
ance the interests of creditors and shareholders. 
Instead, debtors should be allowed to retain existing man-
agers—including managers recently appointed at the insistence 
of creditors—if the debtor proves by clear and convincing evi-
dence that (1) it is in the best interest of all parties in interest 
to allow those managers to retain control of the debtor during 
the reorganization process and (2) the managers are neutral 
and have no personal interest that would affect their ability to 
protect the interests of all parties involved in the Chapter 11 
proceeding. Courts should allow a creditor to force a firm to 
hire a private trustee only if the individual is disinterested as 
defined by § 327, is not controlled by (and does not report to) 
the creditor, and has the power to make decisions for the debtor 
without seeking creditor approval.237 Unlike the partial disclo-
sure some private trustees are required to make in at least one 
bankruptcy district,238 private trustees should be required to 
make a full disclosure that explains the relationships they have 
with all other parties involved in the case. 
Applying this test would not prevent firms from hiring pri-
vate trustees during or immediately before the Chapter 11 fil-
ing. It would just require that those managers have clear fidu-
ciary duties to all parties in interest and not have relationships 
with creditors that would prevent them from making impartial 
and independent decisions. Requiring debtors to retain private 
trustees as professionals should both decrease the number of 
people who are paid to exercise control over the Chapter 11 
debtor and also place the proposed compensation of these enti-
ties under greater scrutiny. In addition to reducing these direct 
costs, simplifying the management structure should help re-
duce the likelihood that debtors will be forced to provide in-
demnification to private trustees, existing managers, other pro-
 
tions). 
 237. See Jay Lawrence Westbrook, The Control of Wealth in Bankruptcy, 82 
TEX. L. REV. 795, 827 (2004) (suggesting that “bankruptcy neutrality is essen-
tial to the management of a general default,” because bankruptcy involves 
competing interests). 
 238. See U.S. Trustee Program, supra note 229. 
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fessionals, or examiners for claims filed against them as a re-
sult of their employment by the DIP.239 
Of course, there will be costs associated with a bankruptcy 
system that increases disclosure requirements, requires firms 
to prove that private trustees are independent and unbiased, 
and potentially disqualifies some competent turnaround spe-
cialists. Those costs240 should be offset by the savings that will 
result from reducing the number of managers, private trustees, 
examiners, outside financial advisors, mediators, and potential-
ly other professionals241 working simultaneously in the same 
case and often on the same matters. An early determination 
 
 239. Mark Ribbing, Turnaround Firms Watch Merry-Go-Round Suit, BALT. 
SUN, Dec. 7, 1997, at 1D. These demands for indemnification are similar to 
those routinely made by investment bankers. See COLLIER COMPENSATION, 
EMPLOYMENT & APPOINTMENT OF TRUSTEES AND PROFESSIONALS IN BANK-
RUPTCY CASES ¶ 1.15 (2007). Indeed, the retention agreements proposed by 
investment bankers typically seek indemnification against their own negli-
gence. Id. Not all courts have been always willing to approve such agreements, 
though. See, e.g., In re Mortgage & Realty Trust, 123 B.R. 626, 631 (Bankr. 
C.D. Cal. 1991). 
 240. For example, while requiring the DIP to prove that its managers are 
both competent and do not hold or represent interests that are adverse to the 
estate may require parties to participate in one additional hearing, it is likely 
that this will become part of the first day matters that are routine in large 
bankruptcy filings. 
 241. Creditors sometimes ask courts to appoint a responsible party—
instead of a trustee—who would be paid by the debtor, would report to the 
creditor, and would make all major executive decisions. See In re Commc’n Op-
tions, Inc., 299 B.R. 481, 482 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2003) (appointing a “responsi-
ble party” to act for the DIP); In re SunCruz Casinos, LLC, 298 B.R. 821, 830–
32 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2003) (rejecting suggestion to appoint a responsible per-
son to perform the duties of a DIP or trustee); In re NRG Res., Inc., 64 B.R. 
643, 646–47 (W.D. La. 1986) (stating that DIP no longer exists once trustee is 
appointed); In re FSC Corp., 38 B.R. 346, 350 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1983) (describ-
ing the powers of a responsible party). A responsible party also was appointed 
in the bankruptcy of Livent, Inc. See THE 2004 BANKRUPTCY YEARBOOK & AL-
MANAC, supra note 109, at 332–33. Some courts also have approved the ap-
pointment of a “limited purpose trustee” that does not displace the DIP and, 
instead, shares the status of estate representative with the DIP. See, e.g., In re 
Madison Mgmt. Group, Inc., 137 B.R.275, 282–83 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1992). Hav-
ing a limited purpose trustee who shares control of the company with the DIP 
is problematic because the Code mandates that the trustee assume control of 
all the property of the estate and serve as the representative of the estate. 11 
U.S.C. §§ 323, 521(4) (2000 & Supp. 2006). Moreover, the Code does not pro-
vide for trustees with limited powers and it is unclear how a trustee could tho-
roughly investigate the debtor’s financial transactions if it shares manage-
ment duties with the managers who may have participated in the improper 
transactions. Official Comm. of Asbestos Pers. Injury Claimants v. Sealed Air 
Corp. (In re Sealed Air Corp.), 285 B.R. 148, 157 (Bankr. D. Del. 2002) (refus-
ing to appoint limited purpose trustee). 
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about the qualifications of the firm’s managers should decrease 
the costs associated with having too many managers perform-
ing substantially similar tasks. It also should eliminate chal-
lenges to the management structure that hedge funds or other 
distressed debt investors might make after purchasing credi-
tors’ claims (or equity’s interests) early in a case, when the late 
entrants then seek to increase their leverage in the case by 
challenging the professional’s fees. 
Critically examining the debtor’s management structure 
early in the case would have other benefits. For example, it 
should decrease the amount of satellite litigation concerning 
whether the managers breached their fiduciary duties to 
shareholders or creditors prebankruptcy while the firm was in-
solvent or in the zone of insolvency, or whether the managers’ 
prepetition activities deepened the firm’s insolvency. Requiring 
managers to be unbiased should also decrease the number of 
challenges to management’s decisions to restructure or liqui-
date the firm, to discontinue certain business operations, to re-
tain certain employees or pay key employees bonuses to remain 
with the business, or to alter the firm’s relationship with cer-
tain employees or favored creditors.242 
Ensuring that managers are neutral should decrease the 
disputes involving pay-to-stay or incentivizing bonus plans. If 
 
 242. Courts often give managers wide discretion to determine which credi-
tor is “critical” and rarely require creditors to attest in writing or orally at the 
hearing that they will refuse to do business with the debtor in the future if 
their prepetition claims are not paid. See Order Authorizing Payment of Pre-
petition Claims of Critical Vendors at 1–2, In re Enron Corp., No. 01-16034 
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Dec. 3, 2001) (allowing managers to pay critical-vendor 
claims “in their discretion”); see also Stephen Cousings et al., First Day Or-
ders: An Examination, 11 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 213, 215 (2002). At least one 
judge ordered all critical venders to come to court and state that they would 
refuse to do business with the debtor unless the court approved the critical-
vendor motion. See Soma Biswas, Kmart Ruling Claws Back Payments, DAILY 
DEAL, Mar 1, 2004, 2004 WLNR 17771888. A system that presumptively uti-
lizes impartial managers should reduce the number of creditor contentions 
that managers are paying favored vendors. See Patricia L. Barsalou & Zack 
Mosner, Preferential First-Day Orders: Same Question, Different Look, AM. 
BANKR. INST. J., Feb. 2003, at 8; Russell A. Eisenberg & Frances F. Gecker, 
The Doctrine of Necessity and Its Parameters, 73 MARQ. L. REV. 1, 24–26 
(1989); Margaret Newkirk, Courts Compete to Bag Big Cases, ATLANTA J.-
CONST., Feb. 29, 2004, at E1 (contending that managers use first-day orders 
“to take care of friends and award themselves hefty retention bonuses or se-
verance”). Once the court either has determined that the managers should be 
replaced or agrees that the managers are presumptively neutral and qualified 
to remain in control of the debtor, creditors should be less skeptical of critical-
vendor motions. 
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firms must prove that it is in the best interest of the reorgani-
zation to allow existing managers to control the reorganization 
process, this proof should be sufficient to satisfy the Code’s re-
quirement that the employee is essential to the survival of the 
business. Thus, the court’s finding that managers should be al-
lowed to remain in control of the debtor should also resolve 
many of the issues that would be raised in a hearing on a mo-
tion to approve a key employee retention plan. 
 CONCLUSION  
Congress adopted the DIP manager-controlled model based 
on the assumptions that existing managers had valuable expe-
rience and expertise and that the managers were not responsi-
ble for the firm’s financial distress. The current practice of dis-
placing managers just before or after the firm files for 
bankruptcy and replacing them with creditor-controlled private 
trustees suggests that the underlying premises for Chapter 11’s 
manager-controlled presumption may no longer be sound. 
However, even if it is better as a normative matter to replace 
managers with a privatized trustee, a creditor should not be al-
lowed to give control of the debtor to an entity that is not an 
employee of the firm, that reports to an individual creditor or 
creditor group, and that may have irreconcilable conflicts of in-
terests. Instead, privatized trustees should be allowed to con-
trol firms in bankruptcy only if they can prove that they are in-
dependent and unbiased and are willing and able to protect all 
parties’ interests in the bankruptcy case, not just the interest of 
the person who got them hired. 
